Corporate Outreach – 2014
Please note that this report is archived, as it was written in November, 2014 and is not up to our current standards.
What is Corporate Outreach?
We use the term corporate outreach to refer to any campaign where an activist or animal advocacy organization seeks to directly influence the behavior of a corporation. Some organizations that do outreach seek to establish professional relationships with corporations in the food industry and use those relationships to help them implement policies that improve animal welfare.1 Some organizations that do corporate outreach use petitions, media exposure, and other forms of public pressure to influence corporations to implement policies that improve animal welfare.2 Not all corporate outreach is focused on welfare goals; some campaigns address abolitionist goals by using relationships or public pressure to induce companies to remove animal products from their recipes for certain products or to increase the number of plant-based foods they produce.3,4
Corporate outreach is related to other institutional campaigns like efforts to implement Meatless Mondays or cage-free egg policies in schools and hospitals, because in all institutional campaigns a small number of decision makers implement policies that affect relatively large numbers of animals.5 It is different from these campaigns because corporations are structured differently from school districts and other institutions, so different tactics are available to activists.6
What are its strengths?
In the best case scenario, corporate outreach can be an extremely efficient way of securing short-term or even long-term welfare gains for a large number of farmed animals.7 Most campaigns focused on ending particular confinement practices (most often battery cages for laying hens and gestation crates for breeding sows) are eventually successful,8,9 and we believe most of these campaigns are significantly more efficient than attempting to convince individual consumers to purchase only cage-free eggs or gestation-crate-free pork.10
Successful campaigns involving particularly large corporations also affect the norms of how animals are treated in industrial agriculture.11 When a particular practice has been condemned by many large corporations who are not known for their concern for animal welfare, that affects how legislators, other corporate decision makers, and the public view that practice.12 It makes it easier for activists to get laws passed banning the practice as an unusually cruel one.13 It may also influence the extent to which people perceive farmed animals’ suffering as worthy of concern.14
What are its weaknesses?
Corporate outreach campaigns are somewhat limited in terms of the changes they can promote with a reasonable probability of success; campaigns on confinement issues seem to have more success than campaigns to introduce vegan options at chain restaurants.15 Food industry corporations, whether directly involved in animal agriculture or only in producing foods for consumers, are not likely to be receptive to requests that they drastically modify their practices unless those requests are accompanied by compelling economic interests, including those resulting from high levels of public concern.16 While it is possible to make a compelling economic case that a company should avoid the use of intense confinement practices, especially if those practices are not used by its competitors, this relies on the public’s disapproval of those practices.17 While at the present time a large proportion of the public finds specific practices used in large scale animal agriculture upsetting and unethical, only a much smaller proportion finds the exploitation of animals for food unethical in general, and most people accept that animal products require some suffering on the part of the animals producing them.18 Advocates’ ability to convince most companies to make a given change relies on a perception that the public would also demand such a change if it were paying attention.19 Beyond the cases of battery cages and gestation crates, it’s not clear to what extent the public would support changes proposed by animal advocates, and we would expect it to be difficult to persuade companies to make changes the public does not care about or would not support.20 Unless other efforts change the public’s views of animal agriculture, corporate outreach efforts may not be able to create large-scale change except regarding a limited set of practices the public already views as cruel.21
What about long term effects?
Possible Positive Effects
It is possible that by promoting discussion of conditions for farmed animals, and embodying that discussion in policies of institutions like corporations, corporate outreach encourages a norm of caring whether these animals suffer.22 It is also possible that increased costs of raising animals in more humane conditions could ultimately lead to fewer animals being raised for food at all and form part of a transition away from raising animals for food.23 Finally, campaigns that explicitly seek to increase the availability of plant-based foods do not seem to have any of the potential drawbacks of campaigns focused on welfare improvements, though so far they have in general been less successful.24
Possible Negative Effects
Corporate outreach may help strengthen animal agriculture in the long term by relieving some of the most extreme contradictions between the way the general public would like animals to be treated and the way that they are actually treated in industrial agriculture.25 This could prevent activists from gaining sufficient support to make more drastic overhauls to the way animals are treated,26 or it could simply support demand for animal products at a higher level than would otherwise exist.27 We have no evidence of the former function, and would not expect any, as such large-scale historical forces are extremely difficult to recognize or measure until their effects are already pronounced.28 There is some indirect evidence that improved animal welfare standards would increase demand for animal products; media coverage of undercover investigations of animal agriculture has been linked to reduced demand for animal products,29 so it is logical to conclude that by raising welfare standards, producers can raise demand for their products or at least hope to avoid publicity that would lower demand for them.30
Conclusions
Overall, we do not think most organizations engaging in corporate outreach view it as part of a coherent strategy to provide benefits to animals in the far future.31 Its long-term effects are not well-understood and could be either positive or negative. As with most interventions performed by animal advocates, we think the long-term effects are more likely to be positive than negative, because promoting concern for animals’ interests is so important that in the absence of strong reasons to believe the effects are negative, we expect the effects to be positive on balance.32 We don’t think the long-term effects of any animal advocacy intervention are extremely well understood, though some seem clearer than the long-term effects of corporate outreach, and so we put limited weight on this consideration in our overall understanding of how effective or ineffective any intervention is.33
Do we recommend it? Why or why not?
We recommend corporate outreach conditionally, as an intervention which has extremely high potential to increase animal welfare in the short to medium term when conducted thoughtfully.34 Only some kinds of corporate outreach interventions appear to reach this potential, most notably those that are part of a larger strategy targeting an entire industry.35,36,37 Furthermore, we believe that a sustainable approach to animal advocacy must also consist of elements that attempt to influence public opinion more directly, both to provide further impetus for institutional change38 and because changes in norms and public opinion have clearer long-term effects than changes in corporate policy or the law alone.39
What are characteristics of a strong corporate outreach campaign?
- The campaign forms part of a strategic plan to change broader industry norms and practices.40 A campaign that fits into a larger strategy is more likely to have a fully thought-out plan for how activists will convince the target corporation to change.41 Furthermore, campaigns that ask multiple corporations within an industry to make the same policy changes can reinforce each other by their success more effectively than can campaigns with disparate targets and goals.42,43,44
- The campaign is conducted by an organization or individual who is committed to pursuing it over a period of weeks to years.45,46 Advocates we spoke to emphasized the crucial role of persistence in creating successful campaigns.47,48 Campaign staff should be prepared for companies to be unresponsive to initial contacts and should be ready to pursue the campaign using alternative means if a particular approach is unsuccessful.49
- The campaign is conducted by an organization with prior experience with corporate and institutional campaigns, or the leaders of the campaign have discussed possible strategies with an experienced organization.50 There are many organizations with strong records in corporate outreach, and advocates should use their experience to inform future campaigns.51 Some organizations that have had success with corporate outreach are Compassion in World Farming, Humane Society of the US (Farm Animal Protection Campaign), Mercy For Animals, and The Humane League. Each of these groups uses somewhat different tactics.52
How strong is the evidence about the efficiency of corporate outreach?
In some respects, the evidence about corporate outreach is extremely strong, because it is a type of intervention whose effects are particularly easy to understand. The desired outcome is usually a policy change, and it is easy to tell whether a corporation has drafted and implemented a new policy, particularly if they have an open relationship with an advocacy organization.53 Most corporate outreach is done by organizations who conduct many campaigns per year, or even many campaigns at a time, so they have plenty of opportunities to observe which tactics work and which do not and to estimate their overall success rates and the characteristics of an average campaign.54 Because corporate policy changes (especially in corporations closer to the agriculture side of the food industry) have a fairly direct effect on animal welfare, it is also relatively clear how the outcome of a campaign ultimately affects animals.55 Corporations who supply animal products can make direct changes in animal welfare by changing the requirements for farms they work with and helping farmers implement the new system.56 Corporations who purchase animal products from suppliers and sell them to consumers are sometimes large enough that a shift in their buying requirements will precipitate a shift from their suppliers.57
However, there are significant gaps in our understanding of the medium to long term effects of corporate outreach, where data is not as naturally available to advocates as a byproduct of conducting the campaigns. The first gap is in understanding the implementation of corporate policies. While corporations make public updates to their policies that improve animal welfare standards, these policies are often designed to be implemented over a period of years.58 They may not continue to offer updates on whether they are meeting the timelines laid out by their original policy changes, and if they do, it may not be easy for animal advocates to independently verify their claims.59 Concerns about implementation and follow-up are warranted because issues have arisen in the past.60 It is also generally unclear what the counterfactual impact of corporate outreach is; some companies adopt policies to improve farm conditions without being contacted by animal advocates, so we must consider that some who adopt such policies after being contacted by advocates would have done so on their own after some longer time interval.61 On the other hand, some companies who adopt such policies apparently on their own may be doing so in response to changes in the industry attributable in part to corporate outreach efforts.62 We think that animal advocates working in corporate outreach generally cause policies to be implemented 1-10 years before they would have been implemented by corporations anyway, but acknowledge that this is an estimate not based on direct evidence.63 Alternatively, for practices that would not have been otherwise adopted and which companies may abandon in the future, we think a 1-10 year period of improved practices is likely; corporate policies are not decided or changed on a whim, so very short time periods are less likely than somewhat longer ones.64 However, it is important to note that for policies calling for gradual implementation, the 1-10 years they are in effect may consist of time in which the company explores options for implementing the change, or implements it for some but not all animals which should eventually be affected.65
Finally, there is extremely limited evidence available to suggest how corporate outreach may shift conditions for farmed animals over the very long term. We aren’t aware of anyone who has attempted to study this subject explicitly, and there are few clear parallels to past situations in other movements.66 In the absence of strong evidence, multiple contradictory theories are possible for how corporate outreach could affect the situation for animals in the far future, as we discussed above.
Resources
Conversation with Josh Balk
Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014)
“The vast majority of the victories HSUS has gotten in corporate outreach have been the results of friendly negotiation with executives, shareholder resolutions, and working with investors.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“THL uses some tactics that other groups doing corporate advocacy wouldn’t use. Once they have chosen a target for a campaign, they contact the company and say that the company is behind on an issue and using practices the public does not support, but that their preference is to resolve the situation quietly by the company making a commitment to boycotting battery cages (or the relevant practice). If that doesn’t work, THL will set up petition pages with Change.org… They will also set up a website, often with a video associating the company with the issue, and send this out to leadership and staff members to show that the public is responding. Once the petition gets enough signatures, they reach out to media and retailers (for food manufacturers) and point out how many consumers have gotten involved. In general, at this point they reach out to stakeholders like other businesses and investors to increase the pressure on a company. THL also does some grassroots action, like leafleting outside locations to inform customers or potential customers about the issue[.]” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“Once HSUS has a relationship with a company, it is easier to bring up other issues; for instance Compass Group now has policies about cage-free eggs, gestation crates, and encouraging meat reduction.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Compassion over Killing has conducted campaigns to get companies making vegetarian meat substitutes to remove eggs from their product line or provide vegan options and to encourage chain restaurants to provide more vegan menu items.
“The first step [on Meatless Mondays] is similar [to corporate campaigns and cage-free egg policies at schools]; THL meets with the dining team and tries to sell it to them citing other schools doing it, reasons why it is a good idea, and good press coverage other districts have gotten. If that doesn’t work, they’re usually worried that the community or parents will be upset. THL goes to classrooms, via humane ed or otherwise, and goes door-to-door in residential neighborhoods, to get signatures from students and parents in support of the idea.” Ultimately, they use public pressure (if needed) to convince the dining team to make a change. – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“The big difference between working with corporations and working with school districts is that HSUS has purchased stock in virtually every major publicly traded food company. This allows them to continue trying to work with companies even if the companies are not interested. With school districts (unless there’s a grassroots campaign), if the Director of dining doesn’t want to engage in dialogue, it’s hard to continue pursuing change in that district. However, there are so many schools out there that even if 98% don’t respond to HSUS’s calls or emails, there are enough districts who engage to create massive change.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Based on estimates of corporate outreach campaign costs and effects provided by The Humane League and the Humane Society of the United States, we estimate that a corporate outreach campaign relieves an equivalent of approximately 5 years of factory farm suffering per dollar spent. However, our error bounds were very wide, between .002 and 8,821 years of suffering averted per dollar. Our uncertainty came from two sources:
1. Most significantly, uncertainty about the average amount of suffering averted by a corporate policy change. While it is possible to assess how many animals are affected per year by policies implemented after a campaign is completed, we don’t feel we have a good understanding of how many years of policy change can be attributed to a campaign (because companies could go back on their commitments and also because companies could change their policies based on evolving industry norms without being contacted directly by animal advocates). We also don’t have a good sense of how much of the total suffering of life on a factory farm is averted by the kinds of policies typically implemented as a result of corporate outreach.
2. Variance in costs and outcomes between campaigns. Campaigns that use public pressure or require the purchase of corporate stock to influence can be much more expensive than campaigns that in which animal advocates have an easier time gaining access to corporate decision makers. Also, campaigns involving very large corporations can have significantly larger outcomes than campaigns involving smaller companies; an organization’s effectiveness at corporate outreach could vary significantly based on the types of companies they were able to target and influence. See our Corporate Outreach Intervention Calculation Sheet.
“THL has not failed to get a commitment from any company they have targeted with a public campaign.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“HSUS’s team is actively engaged in communication with around 100 major food companies at a time. It can take several weeks to several years for these discussions to result in policy changes…The vast majority of the victories HSUS has gotten in corporate outreach have been the results of friendly negotiation with executives, shareholder resolutions, and working with investors. Josh states there were only 4 larger campaigns in the past 10 years.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
We do not know of any specific attempts to measure the effectiveness of campaigns aiming to persuade individual consumers to purchase cage-free eggs or other higher welfare products. Because of confusing and poorly regulated welfare labeling, we think such efforts face very difficult conditions, at least in the United States. USDA definitions of common terms such as “cage-free”, “natural”, and “free-range” often do not conform to consumer expectations, so advocates must not only convince consumers that it is necessary for their food to be produced humanely, but also teach them to recognize whether it has been. – USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. (2012). National Organic Program.
HSUS has recently led a major push to eliminate gestation crates from the pork industry, largely through corporate campaigns. “Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well. So in any sector, they need a leader to make the first policy. For gestation crates, that was McDonald’s on the restaurant side, Compass Group on the foodservice side, ConAgra on food manufacturing, and Safeway in groceries. Once they have these leaders, they can point out these successes to competitors to demonstrate that the change will fit in their business model. The gestation crate campaign has been very successful with these tactics; virtually every major player in the food industry has created a policy against it…HSUS is close now to having so many victories on the gestation crate issue that the practice will die out.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“The hardest victory in an area is the first one. Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Corporate policies are also cited as examples in public discourse about animal welfare. For instance, policies from McDonald’s, Burger King, and Smithfield are cited in a recent New York Times op ed explaining why New Jersey should ban gestation crates. – Maher, B. (October 17 2014). Free Pigs from the Abusive Crates. New York Times.
“Legislators want to know what corporations are doing, and corporations want to know what legislators are doing, so both types of effort help each other. Corporate and legal bans feed off each other in a positive way.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Individual moral judgements are affected by perceptions of others’ moral beliefs. Because food corporations are mostly not known for their concern for animal welfare, when they take visible steps to prevent animal suffering, their implied belief that animals suffer and reducing their suffering is the right thing to do is likely to be perceived as reflecting a larger moral consensus. Individuals who do not agree with this perceived consensus will tend to shift their views toward what they perceive as the norm, usually without conscious effort.
This view of moral reasoning as a social and intuitive process is derived from that articulated by Jonathan Haidt in The Righteous Mind.
Campaign success also varies due to other factors than the campaign goal, including the type of outreach used and the attitudes of executives at particular companies. But campaigns on confinement issues seem dramatically quicker to result in success than similar campaigns to reduce use of animals products or to provide plant-based alternatives. For example, The Humane League and Compassion Over Killing both use public pressure to encourage corporate change.
The Humane League has focused on confinement issues, and their “campaigns each last at most a few months before the corporation makes some type of commitment to a policy. THL has not conducted any active campaigns that didn’t result in policy change within this timeframe.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
Compassion Over Killing has led several corporate outreach campaigns focused on reducing animal product consumption and providing vegan options. We think their campaign regarding Dunkin’ Donuts has been typical of campaigns which engage chain restaurants in this area. Compassion Over Killing began convincing individual locations to offer soymilk in 2008. But their public calls for the chain to offer dairy-free milk and vegan donuts at all locations date to at least 2010 and did not result in company-wide change until 2014, when Dunkin’ Donuts announced they would begin carrying almond milk in all locations. – Compassion Over Killing. We Love Dunkin.
“Every company is different, but even the most difficult will make changes if THL can convince them that it is in their rational economic interest to do so; they can’t just continue in their practices whatever the cost. Some companies see themselves as trying to be humane to animals, and others have their identity tied up in their relationships with animal farmers, but ultimately all of them react to their economic interests.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
This is particularly true when confinement practices are cheaper to use than the alternative. One reason why anti-gestation-crate campaigns have been so successful is that gestation crates do not make a large difference to the cost of producing pork, so advocates need not produce as large a reputational threat as when discussing other practices, such as the use of battery cages, which affect costs more substantially.
“Corporate executives are usually very busy with other things and often not aware of the details of farming practices until HSUS brings them to their attention. This makes confinement practices a good first issue to discuss, because they are easy to grasp in a limited amount of time. It’s not too difficult to convince companies that moving away from those practices is the right thing to do, but figuring out how to do it can be harder. On the gestation crate front, this hasn’t been as hard, but with cage-free eggs there are cost issues that need motivation and creativity to surmount.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
A telephone survey developed by academic Researchers found that most Americans expressed concern over farm animal welfare, with a majority of respondents saying that housing chickens in cages and pigs in crates was inhumane. However, fewer than 3% of respondents were vegetarian, and respondents rated farm animal welfare overall as a less important concern than food prices, food safety, or the financial well-being of US farmers. – Lusk, J.L. et. al. Consumer Preferences for Farm Animal Welfare.
Advocates also sometimes draw public attention to an issue, to demonstrate what the public reaction actually is and apply further pressure to companies. “If [directly requesting that executives make policy changes] doesn’t work, THL will set up petition pages with Change.org, which helps get the message out and also contacts the target of the campaign each time someone signs a petition. They will also set up a website, often with a video associating the company with the issue, and send this out to leadership and staff members to show that the public is responding. Once the petition gets enough signatures, they reach out to media and retailers (for food manufacturers) and point out how many consumers have gotten involved. In general, at this point they reach out to stakeholders like other businesses and investors to increase the pressure on a company. THL also does some grassroots action, like leafleting outside locations to inform customers or potential customers about the issue, which doesn’t necessarily have a big direct impact, but is upsetting and annoying and increases the pressure to reach a resolution.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
Such changes include increases in the proportion of vegan or vegetarian items on restaurant menus and supermarket shelves. While consumers are unlikely to actively oppose such a change, most likely would not feel strongly positive about it either. The Vegetarian Resource Group has commissioned two nationally representative polls to determine how often Americans order vegetarian meals when dining out, and each found that around 6 percent of the population always chooses a vegetarian dish, while around 40 percent of the population never orders a vegetarian meal. The rest of the population sometimes orders vegetarian food; while these people might appreciate additional vegetarian options, it’s likely that most would not feel strongly one way or the other. – Stahler, C. (2008). How Many People Order Vegetarian Meals When Eating Out? Vegetarian Journal.
There will always be some variation in what corporate outreach can achieve based on the leadership of individual corporations, including some companies making changes ahead of public opinion because they see themselves as particularly caring towards animals. “Some companies see themselves as trying to be humane to animals, and others have their identity tied up in their relationships with animal farmers, but ultimately all of them react to their economic interests.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
Individual moral judgements are affected by perceptions of others’ moral beliefs. Because food corporations are mostly not known for their concern for animal welfare, when they take visible steps to prevent animal suffering, their implied belief that animals suffer and reducing their suffering is the right thing to do is likely to be perceived as reflecting a larger moral consensus. Individuals who do not agree with this perceived consensus will tend to shift their views toward what they perceive as the norm, usually without conscious effort.
This view of moral reasoning as a social and intuitive process is derived from that articulated by Jonathan Haidt in The Righteous Mind.
Not all changes that advocates view as improving animal welfare impose similar increases in production costs of animal products. In particular, corporations have been slower to eliminate battery cages for chickens than gestation crates for sows in part because the cost difference in larger for cage-free eggs than for gestation-crate-free pork. “On the gestation crate front, [convincing companies to change] hasn’t been as hard, but with cage-free eggs there are cost issues that need motivation and creativity to surmount.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Some changes, such as eliminating the use of fast-growing poultry, would likely be more expensive than eliminating battery cages.
Here we consider success on the most basic terms: a campaign is successful if it achieves its stated goal, and more successful the more quickly the goal is reached. Whether campaigns that seek to reduce the use of animal products are more or less successful than campaigns for welfare improvements in terms of their effects on animal lives is a difficult question both empirically (because suffering is hard to measure objectively) and philosophically (because there are concerns such as animal freedom from human use, which are not equally addressed by the two types of campaigns). We think that campaigns to increase the availability of plant-based foods have had little enough success in the first sense that they are also less successful in the second sense, but from some points of view, welfare-based campaigns might not even be capable of success in the second sense.
We do not have a complete accounting of all corporate outreach campaigns, and campaign success also varies due to other factors than the campaign goal, including the type of outreach used and the attitudes of executives at particular companies. But campaigns on confinement issues seem dramatically quicker to result in success than similar campaigns to reduce use of animals products or to provide plant-based alternatives. For example, The Humane League and Compassion Over Killing both use public pressure to encourage corporate change.
The Humane League has focused on confinement issues, and their “campaigns each last at most a few months before the corporation makes some type of commitment to a policy. THL has not conducted any active campaigns that didn’t result in policy change within this timeframe.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
Compassion Over Killing has led several corporate outreach campaigns focused on reducing animal product consumption and providing vegan options. We think their campaign regarding Dunkin’ Donuts has been typical of campaigns which engage chain restaurants in this area. Compassion Over Killing began convincing individual locations to offer soymilk in 2008. But their public calls for the chain to offer dairy-free milk and vegan donuts at all locations date to at least 2010 and did not result in company-wide change until 2014, when Dunkin’ Donuts announced they would begin carrying almond milk in all locations. – Compassion Over Killing. We Love Dunkin.
A wide variety of surveys have found that consumers care how farmed animals are treated, at least in some respects, and that they commonly misinterpret food labels to mean that animals have been treated more humanely than they actually have been. This tension is a potential source of support for farm animal advocates. – Animal Welfare Institute. Consumer Perceptions of Farm Animal Welfare.
Some countries have banned production of foie gras, a product which plays a small role in typical diets but which also is produced under particularly cruel conditions. If the cruel conditions are a crucial part of activists’ ability to get bans on production of specific animal products, specific industries within animal agriculture which modify their practices to be less obviously cruel will be harder for animal activists to fight in fundamental ways.
That is, some people may be willing to purchase animal products but only if they are produced under circumstances they consider humane. If these circumstances are not actually good for animals, then it might be better not to provide this option. In fact many consumers claim that their purchasing decisions are at least in part guided by animal welfare, but it is likely that this is influenced by social desirability bias. – Lusk, J.L. et. al. Consumer Preferences for Farm Animal Welfare.
We think this is true in virtually all cases. For example, immediately after World War I, popular opinion held that the war had been so terrible that no one would risk another such conflict with modern weaponry, and leaders tried to establish international structures that would prevent another such conflict. But historians now believe that the terms of the peace settlement contributed to the rise of the Nazi party and the outbreak of World War II. It is often difficult to determine the impacts of specific policy decisions or action groups even in retrospect. MIRI has conducted some research on whether reliably good long-range predictions are achievable.
“The key findings of this study can be summarised as media coverage of animal well-being and welfare has (i) reduced US pork and poultry demand and (ii) largely reallocated expenditure to non-meat food rather than across competing meats.” – Tonsor, G. T., & Olynk, N. J. (2011). Impacts of Animal Well‐Being and Welfare Media on Meat Demand. Journal of Agricultural Economics.
Raising welfare standards to the point that the most common methods of raising animals for food did not appear cruel to the typical consumer would reduce the salience of undercover investigations and animal advocacy protests to the mainstream media, potentially reducing coverage by the media of animal welfare issues, especially coverage sympathetic to animal advocates.
This may be because the far future is difficult to think about strategically at all. We do think many organizations engaging in corporate outreach view it as part of a coherent short or medium term strategy. For instance, “The first consideration in planning a campaign at HSUS is the type of change that they want for animals. Much of Josh’s focus at both HSUS and COK has been on the suffering of chickens in the egg industry, and specifically in battery cages. They devised a strategy to ultimately try to abolish battery cages; part of that strategy was to work with corporations, especially major egg buyers, to start switching them to cage-free eggs.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Animal advocates and corporations typically promote the results of corporate outreach in terms of the benefit to animals, thus at minimum helping to normalize the belief that farm animal welfare is worth deliberately protecting. These messages transfer to media reporting. Here are some examples of coverage:
Barclay, E. (August 22 2014). Nestle Nudges its Suppliers to Improve Animal Welfare. NPR.
Gee, K. (January 9 2014). Tyson Urges Hog Farmers to Improve Animal Welfare. Wall Street Journal.
Martin, A. (March 28 2007). Burger King Shifts Policy on Animals. New York Times.
We don’t have a formal method for weighing multiple considerations against one another. Since it seems likely that the vast majority of animals we can affect will live in the far future, however, if we were certain about the long-term effects of many interventions, this would probably be our primary consideration in deciding what to promote. It is not, because although it is very important, we don’t have enough confidence in our predictions to base all our decisions on what we believe about the far future.
Based on estimates of corporate outreach campaign costs and effects provided by The Humane League and the Humane Society of the United States, we estimate that a corporate outreach campaign relieves an equivalent of approximately 5 years of factory farm suffering per dollar spent. However, our error bounds were very wide, between .002 and 8,821 years of suffering averted per dollar. Our uncertainty came from two sources:
1. Most significantly, uncertainty about the average amount of suffering averted by a corporate policy change. While it is possible to assess how many animals are affected per year by policies implemented after a campaign is completed, we don’t feel we have a good understanding of how many years of policy change can be attributed to a campaign (because companies could go back on their commitments and also because companies could change their policies based on evolving industry norms without being contacted directly by animal advocates). We also don’t have a good sense of how much of the total suffering of life on a factory farm is averted by the kinds of policies typically implemented as a result of corporate outreach.
2. Variance in costs and outcomes between campaigns. Campaigns that use public pressure or require the purchase of corporate stock to influence can be much more expensive than campaigns that in which animal advocates have an easier time gaining access to corporate decision makers. Also, campaigns involving very large corporations can have significantly larger outcomes than campaigns involving smaller companies; an organization’s effectiveness at corporate outreach could vary significantly based on the types of companies they were able to target and influence. See our Corporate Outreach Intervention Calculation Sheet.
“Corporate outreach campaigns depend on the momentum of previous similar campaigns, and getting the first corporation to make a change might be very hard. But once there is momentum for a type of change, that is available to everyone….There might not be room for infinite growth in this area, but right now it’s really good how much attention corporate outreach is getting. The momentum is building and David thinks it is opening the possibility for changes that may not have been possible several years ago. ” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“The hardest victory in an area is the first one. Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well. So in any sector, they need a leader to make the first policy.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Compassion Over Killing ran a series of successful corporate campaigns to remove eggs from vegetarian products, then ran some less-successful campaigns, whose struggles they attribute partly to the lack of an overall strategy. “COK would need a new strategy to start approaching more companies in the future. They have found success by having specific company targets, getting one to change, and then moving on the to the next one (which is in turn pressured by the change of the previous company).” – Conversation with Erica Meier.
Some groups choose campaign topics based on expected public support, because it is easier to persuade companies to change their policies if they perceive that the public cares about an issue. “The confinement issues are also very visceral and cause a lot of suffering, and this makes it easier to appeal to the public when campaigns are organized around these issues. HSUS and other groups want to utilize the public support on these issues to abolish practices like using battery cages and gestation crates.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Changes in law and corporate policy tend to address only the worst abuses of industrial agriculture, so there is a risk that with those issues addressed, policymakers will not continue to take steps to improve animal welfare or end the use of animals. Groups that attempt to change norms and public opinion often seek to provide a clear moral message that human use of animals is wrong or animal suffering matters, which seems likely to have more robustly positive long-term effects if the message is successfully disseminated.
“The hardest victory in an area is the first one. Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well. So in any sector, they need a leader to make the first policy.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well. So in any sector, they need a leader to make the first policy. … Once they have these leaders, they can point out these successes to competitors to demonstrate that the change will fit in their business model. The gestation crate campaign has been very successful with these tactics; virtually every major player in the food industry has created a policy against it. For cage-free eggs, they have used similar tactics, but those policies are harder to get corporations to implement because they are more expensive.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“Corporate outreach campaigns depend on the momentum of previous similar campaigns, and getting the first corporation to make a change might be very hard. But once there is momentum for a type of change, that is available to everyone.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“The hardest victory in an area is the first one. Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well. So in any sector, they need a leader to make the first policy.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Compassion Over Killing ran a series of successful corporate campaigns to remove eggs from vegetarian products, then ran some less-successful campaigns, whose struggles they attribute partly to the lack of an overall strategy. “COK would need a new strategy to start approaching more companies in the future. They have found success by having specific company targets, getting one to change, and then moving on the to the next one (which is in turn pressured by the change of the previous company).” – Conversation with Erica Meier.
“THL is actively working on about 2 campaigns at a time, with another 2-3 in a less active stage, not counting companies they have contacted but do not plan to target with a larger campaign. These campaigns each last at most a few months before the corporation makes some type of commitment to a policy.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“HSUS’s team is actively engaged in communication with around 100 major food companies at a time. It can take several weeks to several years for these discussions to result in policy changes.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“The two most important skills for someone working on corporate outreach are persistence and good social skills. Companies don’t come to activists; activists have to go to them, and often have to send reminders and reach out persistently.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“To work with the companies, it takes professionalism, the ability to set realistic goals, and tenacity. Tenacity is probably the most important characteristic.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
“If the company is hesitant or does not want to meet, HSUS raises the level of attention on the issue by actions like filing shareholder resolutions, meeting with shareholders, and having friends of executives reach out to ask them to work on the issue.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
Of course, this is stronger as a predictor of success when an organizations has had more success with similar campaigns. But we also think organizations which have done considerable work on a variety of corporate outreach campaigns are well-placed to identify promising new approaches. They may also have corporate contacts that make it easier for them to achieve success in campaigns others would not find tractable. For example, consider the relationship between HSUS and Compass Group:”Once HSUS has a relationship with a company, it is easier to bring up other issues; for instance Compass Group now has policies about cage-free eggs, gestation crates, and encouraging meat reduction.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
“David suggests that individuals who want to get involved start with local Meatless Mondays or cage-free egg campaigns; he recommends reaching out to THL or HSUS for help getting started, as these groups have materials already assembled that will make conducting such a campaign easier.”–Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
Compassion in World Farming engages positively with producers, running an awards program that incentivizes businesses to meet specific standards in order to claim the award.The Humane Society of the US usually engages positively with producers, encouraging them to adopt policies in return for good public relations opportunities, but occasionally uses undercover investigations or stockholder pressure when other tactics don’t work. (See Conversation with Josh Balk.)Mercy For Animals runs undercover investigations with a major goal of exposing typical farming practices to consumers, but also leverages those investigations into corporate outreach when possible, as with recent investigations into Tyson Foods. (See Conversation with Nick Cooney (March 20, 2014).)The Humane League often runs campaigns drawing public attention the farming practices of particular companies, after having approached the company about the policy in question but without having conducted investigations of specific farms. (See Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).)
Even if a company does not have a strong relationship with an advocacy organization, they are likely to publish when they have drafted an improved policy because doing so can generate good public relations. We think it isn’t likely that companies would announce such policy changes if they had no intention of honoring them, though, because the risk of being caught in an overt lie would be worse than the potential downsides to openly engaging in practices that are (or have recently been) industry standard.
However, there is some danger that companies would write a policy intending to adhere to it but for some reason not follow through. We know that in some cases (See Animal Welfare Group Takes Back Food Retailers Award. (March 7 2014). The Poultry Site.), companies have announced these changes, but they may not always do so. Advocates may be able to avoid this risk by structuring policies so that changes must be made with board or shareholder input and by actively following the practices of companies they have worked with.
In preparing this report we spoke with representatives from the Humane Society of the US, who told us that they are engaged with about 100 companies at any given time (See Conversation with Josh Balk.) and from The Humane League, who told us that they are engaged with 2-5 companies at any given time (See Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).). We are aware of organizations which take on occasional corporate campaigns very different from the rest of the work that they do (as with Farm Forward’s campaign relating to Hellman mayonnaise), but there seem to be few enough such campaigns that most are conducted by organizations for which this is a regular part of their activities.
To be precise, corporate outreach has a direct effect on animals relative to outreach directed at changing consumer behavior. There are still intermediate steps, particularly for retail stores and restaurants which buy food from suppliers who buy animal products from meat, dairy, or egg companies, which buy them from farms. But the intermediate steps between a corporate policy change and an effect on animals are clearer than the intermediate steps between a student watching a video and an effect on animals.
For instance Smithfield Foods has over 50% of pregnant sows on its own farms in systems that do not use gestation crates, compared to about 10% nationally. They have also notified farmers who work with them on contract that those contracts will be more likely to be renewed if farmers stop using gestation crates. – Doering, C. (January 7 2014). Smithfield Urges Farmers to Stop Using Gestation Crates. USA Today.
If their requirements do not cause suppliers to change their policies, transferring their business to other suppliers can also make a difference. This is particularly visible when many corporate campaigns target the same policy change.
“HSUS is close now to having so many victories on the gestation crate issue that the practice will die out. Josh is in contact with pork companies, and the companies that still use gestation crates have yet to tell him where they will sell their products as anti-gestation-crate policies go into effect. … Some companies have accepted the new reality and announced plans to make changes, and others will either have to shift or have their competitors take their business.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
We see typical implementation times for policies not implemented immediately in the 5-10 year range, during which time companies gradually switch their entire supply to conform to the new policy. Some policies do not even have a clear timeline attached, as with Hellman’s recent announcement that they would try to implement sexing of chicks in ovo to reduce cruelty in the breeding of laying hens. The Humane Society of the US has a listing of policy updates showing a variety of timelines for policy implementation. – Timeline of Major Farm Animal Protection Advancements. (September 8 2014). HUmane Society of the United States.
Certification agencies do check individual farms enrolled in their programs over time to ensure that they maintain adequate standards of animal welfare. However, animal advocacy groups which encourage companies to adopt less restrictive policies typically do not have the resources to exhaustively check supply chains.
For instance, a European supermarket chain which implemented policies to increase the welfare of broiler chickens in cooperation with Compassion in World Farming recently changed their policy to allow chickens to be kept in more crowded conditions, causing CIWF to revoke the award they had issued to the company. – Animal Welfare Group Takes Back Food Retailers Award. (March 7 2014). The Poultry Site.
“For instance, on the battery cage issue, they might contact a number of retailers, restaurants chains, and so forth. They say they’re working on the issue, mention some competitors that have adopted the desired policy and that the target company is lagging behind, and ask what their plans are. … Some companies say they actually are doing something, or even have already adopted a policy but didn’t put out a press release.” – Conversation with David Coman-Hidy (July 2, 2014).
Advocates typically find that convincing companies to change their policies is easier when competitors have already announced changes. Presumably a similar mechanism also leads to an increase in the number of companies who make a particular policy change without direct requests from animal advocates. “The hardest victory in an area is the first one. Once HSUS starts getting a whole line of companies creating policies, it’s difficult for their competitors not to go along with it as well.” – Conversation with Josh Balk.
The proliferation of corporate welfare policies in response to specific issue campaigns from animal advocates appears too great to be coincidental, especially in the case of gestation crates, which were acknowledged as an issue by industry about ten years before HSUS drastically increased their efforts against gestation crates in 2012, resulting in much faster change. (See Patton, L. (February 13 2012). McDonald’s to Phase Out Pig Crates 11 Years After Chipotle. Bloomberg.) So it seems likely that companies who appear to be adopting a policy because of corporate outreach efforts in general would not have adopted the same policy at the same time without those efforts.
However, corporate outreach works when it makes reasonable demands of companies. This means the decisions companies make are usually decisions they might have eventually made on their own because of trends in the industry or public opinion, or been forced into by default because of changes in the law, as with gestation crate bans in some states. We’ve chosen 10 years as a rather unfavorable-towards-corporate-outreach upper bound for how long it would take companies to arrive at these changes on their own, assuming that animal advocates would continue or increase their use of other tactics such as public education, undercover investigations, and legal initiatives. Of course, because companies affect each others’ behavior, there is very little possibility of truly isolating the effects of corporate outreach on company policy.
It would be falsely optimistic to assume that gains from corporate outreach will endure forever. Even if the relevant corporations retain their market share, farming has become less humane in many ways in the recent past and, despite the efforts of animal advocates, may do so again.
For instance, Smithfield Foods pledged in 2007 to eliminate gestation crates from their facilities by 2017, but dropped the target date in 2009, before converting all their facilities to other housing for pregnant sows. After pressure from HSUS and other groups, they reinstated the deadline in 2011. Had they instead returned to their previous position on gestation crates, at no time would their policy change have affected all the pregnant sows in their farms. – Walzer, P. (December 9 2011). Smithfield to End Use of Gestation Crates by 2017. The Virginian-Pilot.
One parallel that does exist is to the antislavery movement and boycotts of slave-produced goods (with related support for competing industries) and the similar recent “Fair Trade” movement, which also seeks to promote products made by companies who treat human workers fairly. While boycotts of slave-produced goods in the late 1700s and early 1800s did not end slavery as an institution, we don’t see much evidence that they hampered the more radical movements which led to the end of chattel slavery in British territories and in the US. The ultimate effects of the Fair Trade movement are far less clear, since it is ongoing at the present time.
Please note that this report is archived, as it was written in November, 2014 and is not up to our current standards.
Corporate Outreach Intervention Evaluation
The following document contains a template for evaluating virtually any intervention designed to help animals. We use this template to guide our intervention research and make it available for others to use in comparing interventions on their own. Observations about corporate outreach are outlined in the template below, as well as in the Evaluation and Error-tracking subsections for each Area.
There are many ways for an animal activism organization to pursue its goals, and choosing from these options requires understanding a number of quantitative and qualitative factors. Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE) finds it highly useful to standardize the methods by which proposed interventions are evaluated. This is why we use the following evaluation criteria. The criteria are divided into five areas of focus. For each criterion, we propose a method for summarizing everything that can be known about a given intervention. We hope that this will allow us to compare various campaigns across multiple dimensions and thereby maximize the reliability of our recommendations.
At the moment, there are many unknowns regarding the science, economics, and sociology surrounding animal activism interventions. Much of what is now known about how campaigns translate into reductions in animal suffering comes from small samples, anecdotes, or estimation. For this reason, this evaluation tries to provide as much information as possible, while still recognizing the limits of this young field of research. We do this by providing room for significant qualitative evaluation, while also attempting to give rough quantitative summaries of our work.
The evaluation is organized into five areas of focus. (I) type of intervention, (II) certainty of success, (III) barriers to entry, (IV) expected indirect effects, and (V) expected direct effects and overall efficiency analysis.Areas II through III might be of particular interest to organizations deciding what sort of intervention to pursue. Areas IV and V estimate the expected results from staging the intervention, both direct and indirect, and conclude with a calculation sheet that attempts a cost-benefit analysis.
Theoretically, this final cost-benefit consideration, which estimates the expected return on an organization’s investment, is the only important piece of this evaluation template. However, it is important to supplement this with additional reasoning regarding the likely effectiveness of interventions because we expect these calculations to include significant amounts of error and uncertainty. Such additions are especially valuable where they use different evidence than that which is primarily responsible for our cost-effectiveness estimate, since when only weak evidence is available, many independent lines of evidence can be analyzed, and if all agree, a strong conclusion can still be made. Additionally, given the diversity of organizations, with different resources, goals, and tolerance for risk, we thought it would be useful to give a more holistic picture of what each of our examined interventions entails, while still providing our best guess as to how efficient each one is at reducing animal suffering. As an illustration of the importance of including these auxiliary measures,an intervention with high barriers to entry (e.g. very large startup costs) might not be possible for some organizations, while an intervention with high uncertainties of success (i.e. higher risks) is likely to also require more estimations in our evaluations, and thus be prone to more error in our calculations.
Each area of interest includes an evaluation section with specific questions as well as areas for free-response. Additional forms allowing for summary of the evaluation overall are provided at the end of the document. We suggest using the provided forms during the evaluation process to ensure that all areas have been addressed.
This evaluation process is not without subjectivity. It also requires imperfect estimates of quantitative values. We hope that by publishing the materials used in conducting evaluations, these subjective judgements and estimates will be transparent to our audience. In the case of specific interventions, difficulties in evaluation may arise from:
- limited data regarding certain aspects of past campaigns,
- limited information about the connection between the immediate goals of the campaign and help for animals (e.g. neuroscientific or economic questions that have not been answered),
- biases in the information sources we find,
- limited staff of evaluators (limited ability to cross-check judgements),
- limited time in which to conduct the evaluation,
- other areas we have not accounted for.
Even when it is imperfect, we believe that formal analysis is often a useful supplement to decision-making. We strive to make clear where there are gaps in our knowledge so that our conclusions can be integrated appropriately with other sources of information.
Table of Contents
- Suggested method for the summary of all evaluative information
- Areas of evaluation:
Summary of the Evaluation
Activism Philosophy | Activism Approach |
---|---|
typically animal welfare | typically, lobbying and negotiation, sometimes supported by applications of stockholder or investor pressure or petitions, protests, and other public pressure campaigns |
Target Demographics | Target Animal(s) | Size of Campaign | Time Delay between Intervention and Results |
---|---|---|---|
corporate executives | could be any; in current practice primarily egg-laying hens, breeding sows, and veal calves | usually 1-2 people at a larger organization working with multiple companies at a time | some immediate change; many policies have transition timelines of 5-10 years |
General Summary of Area I (Type). |
---|
Corporate outreach is primarily a tool of animal welfare activists and of animal rights activists focused particularly strongly on pragmatism in the short or medium term, as food corporations can enact policies affecting large numbers of animals based on the decision of a few company executives. Most successful corporate campaigns have addressed particularly cruel confinement practices, though a few have resulted in reformulation of certain recipes to use fewer animal products or the inclusion of more plant-based items on menus, resulting in fewer animals used in industrial agriculture overall.
By their nature these campaigns seem likely to affect human interests in only minimal ways, since corporations have strong incentives not to adopt policies that would significantly reduce their profitability or would be perceived as negatively affecting their products. They probably have some slightly chaotic effects on people working in the food industry as certain practices are favored or avoided by new corporate policies, and as this may affect how well corporations perform relative to one another. For instance, as restaurant chains and supermarkets commit to phasing out gestation crate pork, pork suppliers who also decide early to phase out gestation crates may gain business at the expense of competitors who continue to use gestation crates. Organizations that are able to successfully carry out corporate outreach tend to be highly competent in many areas and have a high degree of pragmatism and professionalism, allowing them to interact productively with the corporate world. Being highly competent in other areas and having a strong reputation enhances credibility of the organization and provides opportunities to coordinate requests made of corporations with results of undercover investigations, legal campaigns, and grassroots organizing. Successful corporate campaigns attract attention and support from those organizations which are open to participating in corporate outreach in principle, because once one company in an industry has adopted a particular policy, it is easier to spread that policy to other companies within that market sector than to work on unrelated corporate campaigns. However, a significant number of animal activist organizations would not be interested in any corporate outreach to mainstream food companies, viewing such work as unacceptable collaboration or compromise. |
Code | Question an (R) in the Score column indicates that a score of 1 would be generally considered preferable to a score of 7 |
Score (1-7) |
---|---|---|
II.1.a | How many times has a similar intervention been attempted before? | 6 |
Has a similar intervention ever been attempted in the same context as the one being evaluated? | 6 | |
II.1.b | How widely have previous campaigns varied in total results? | 2 |
How widely have previous campaigns varied in efficiency? | 3 | |
How well have previous predictions of results matched actual results? | 5 | |
How well have previous predictions of costs matched actual costs? | 4/5 | |
II.2 | How many different avenues of success does the campaign have available? | 2/3 |
How many intermediate positive outcomes does the campaign have? | 2 | |
II.3.a | How well understood are the neurological abilities of the primary animal group targeted by the campaign? | 6 |
How well understood are the neurological abilities of any other animal groups targeted by the campaign? | 4 | |
II.3.b | How well understood are individual and social group responses to this type of campaign? | 4 |
How well understood are economic factors affecting the outcome of this campaign? | 3 | |
II.3.c | How well understood is the primary ecological impact of this intervention? | 1 |
How well understood are any other ecological impacts? | 1 | |
II.4.a | How many known uncertainties affect the outcome of the campaign? | 3(R) |
How strongly do known uncertainties affect the outcome of the campaign? | 4(R) | |
II.4.b | How many steps separate the actions of the campaign from a change in animal welfare? | 4(R) |
How many different actors are involved in the chain of events between the success of the campaign and the change in welfare? | 5(R) |
General Summary of Area II (Certainty of Success) |
---|
Corporate outreach focused on improving farm animal welfare offers a relatively high certainty of success for a very specific goal. When a campaign succeeds, it results in a corporation implementing a policy that improves the lives of thousands (and in some cases millions) of animals each year that the policy remains in effect. However, when a campaign fails to achieve its main objective, it has limited fallback potential; because corporate outreach campaigns are designed to achieve specific policy changes that will affect many animals over many years, if they cannot achieve these changes, they may not achieve any change at all. Specific campaigns, however, may have some fallback goals which are not necessarily similar in quality to their main goals: for instance, a campaign might involve petitioning a company to change its practice, and the act of distributing the petition might raise public awareness of an issue and have some effects for animals that way, even if the petition is not ultimately successful in contributing to policy change. Other fallback goals are more similar to the main goals of the campaign: for instance, advocates may hope for a company to transition all of its egg purchases to cage-free eggs, but end up helping the company implement a policy of purchasing a certain percentage of cage-free eggs.
Corporate outreach focused on reducing the number of animal products used in commercially prepared foods or on improving the availability of plant-based food options offers a lower certainty of success. For many corporations, removing animal products from existing foods or adding new product lines is a more drastic change to their business model than changing suppliers for animal products, or working with suppliers to implement new policies. Arguments and tactics invoking public opinion also appear to be less useful to this type of campaign, because the public reacts strongly to specific types of animal cruelty but not as strongly to the presence of animal products in food, or to the absence of plant-based options in a particular company’s offerings. (We know this because campaigns against confinement issues that use public pressure to get a company to change its policies typically last for at most a few months before achieving their goals, while campaigns that use similar tactics to get corporations to add vegan menu items can last for years with minimal success.) Additionally, advocates have conducted fewer campaigns of this type on a national scale, so much less is known about their rates of success. As with other corporate outreach campaigns, while they may have potential to affect animals even if their main goals are not reached, these effects are not necessarily similar to the original goal. Any type of corporate outreach follows a relatively short path in terms of the distance between the intervention and the animals affected. Corporations are the entities that most directly affect the lives of animals involved in industrial agriculture, so corporate outreach is a more direct path to helping those animals than interventions focused on legal change (which would have to be enforced on corporations) or appeals to the broader public (which would have to transmit its values to corporations through economic transactions). Previous campaigns have provided significant information about success rates and effective techniques for campaigns seeking to produce welfare improvements, but less information about other types of campaigns which have been less common. They have also produced relatively little information about the long term and spillover effects of any campaigns. The spillover effect that we would be most concerned about is the possibility that by raising animal welfare standards in industrial agriculture, advocates may delay or even prevent significant societal change that would otherwise reduce suffering in agriculture by a substantially larger amount. We don’t know of significant research or analysis that has been done to either support or allay these concerns about welfare interventions generally, or corporate outreach in particular. |
Code | Question an (R) in the Score column indicates that a score of 1 would be generally considered preferable to a score of 7 |
Score (1-7) |
---|---|---|
III.1 | How many specialized skill sets are required? | 2/3(R) |
How much expertise is required in the most demanding area? | 5(R) | |
III.2.a | How demanding is the typical workload associated with the campaign? | 4(R) |
III.2.b | How many hours per week does the typical staff member work on the campaign when it is making its minimum demands? | 1/2(R) |
How many hours per week does the typical staff member work on the campaign when it is making its maximum demands? | 4(R) | |
III.2.c | How many staff members are involved with the campaign when it is ongoing but at the time when fewest people are working on it? | 1(R) |
How many staff members are involved with the campaign at the time when the most people are working on it? | 2(R) | |
III.3 | How many rare or difficult-to-obtain materials does the campaign require? | 2(R) |
How severe is the difficulty of obtaining the hardest-to-obtain material needed for the campaign? | 5(R) |
General Summary of Area III (Barriers to Entry) |
---|
Corporate campaigns seem to be a natural fit for organizations that value professionalism and pragmatism and have a basic level of financial resources. For organizations that take a more radical stance, or for individuals acting on their own, there may be barriers to entry that prevent them doing the work with high effectiveness, including lack of a suitable reputation or inability/unwillingness to form productive relationships with corporations. While campaigns directly using public pressure to induce companies to change avoid some of the need for organizational reputation, they do require either skills connected with reaching the public (through websites and videos or other means) or the ability to hire contractors with these skills.
The skill sets involved are not highly technical or specialized, but at the same time, not everyone is well suited to corporate outreach work. There is a real need for high levels of persistence and social skills, as well as in most cases creativity and ability to work independently. There is no specific educational background or experience required, but we would expect some people to be significantly more effective than others, and that particularly ineffective staff could not just fail to accomplish their goals, but damage prospects for others to succeed later. The intensity of work on a particular campaign can vary widely, which is one reason staff often work on several campaigns at a time. If multiple campaigns progress through a high-effort period at the same time, this could result in a high intensity workload over that period. |
Code | Question an (R) in the Score column indicates that a score of 1 would be generally considered preferable to a score of 7 |
Score (1-7) |
---|---|---|
IV.1.a | How large a chain effect does the intervention likely have? | 2/3 |
IV.1.b | How likely is the campaign to inspire other victories? | 5 |
IV.1.c | How significant a change in public mindset is this campaign likely to cause? | 2 |
IV.2.a | How much alienation is this campaign likely to cause? | 2/3(R) |
IV.2.b | How high is the risk that the campaign may be more harmful than beneficial? | 3(R) |
General Summary of Area IV (Expected Indirect Effects) |
---|
Corporate outreach campaigns demonstrably have some indirect effects through inspiring other organizations to conduct similar campaigns and providing an environment in which it is easier for future corporate and perhaps legislative campaigns to succeed.
They appear to have relatively few long-term effects and relatively little broader spillover, since campaigns that make requests corporations can accede to by their nature do not change the animal agriculture system in a dramatic way that would be highly visible and memorable for the general public. (Though it is possible that corporate campaigns in the future might achieve goals that are broadly in line with public opinion of their time but dramatic by current standards.) There is some chance that they do have long-term effects outside their direct effects, either by raising the expected standard of farm animal welfare in general (and improving long-term practices and/or releasing energy that might otherwise lead to more drastic change) or by bringing corporate practice more in line with the standard of animal welfare the public already expects and thus increasing demand for animal products. It’s not clear what the overall sign of these effects would be, and we’d expect the magnitude to be relatively small in either case, because we think the case where revolutionary change for animals is averted by corporate outreach by activists is unlikely; changes achieved by corporate outreach are likely not dramatic and visible enough to hamper other activist efforts significantly. |
Final Total: the proposed intervention has a calculated efficiency of (_______), for a campaign of 20 weeks , with results being measured in years of farmed captivity (or equivalent suffering) averted. |
---|
Pessimistic | Realistic | Optimistic |
30 years of suffering averted per $11,030 spent, or .003 years of suffering averted per dollar. | 15,000 years of suffering averted per $4,014 spent, or 4 years of suffering averted per dollar. | 1,900,000 years of suffering averted per $400 spent, or 4750 years of suffering averted per dollar |
Were the optional modifiers used in calculating this total? | No |
Pessimistic | Realistic | Optimistic |
29 years of suffering averted per $13,236 spent, or .002 years of suffering averted per dollar. | 16,170 years of suffering averted per $3,532 spent, or 5 years of suffering averted per dollar. | 2,470,000 years of suffering averted per $280 spent, or 8,821 years of suffering averted per dollar. |
Were the optional modifiers used in calculating this total? | Yes |
Final Determination (Overall Summary and Recommendations) |
---|
Corporate outreach uses relatively few resources and personnel to create relatively large and predictable improvements in short to medium term animal welfare. However, because corporations are unlikely to be responsive to requests that fall outside the concerns of mainstream society, it is not a very effective tool for creating deep change in social views of animals. It is also viewed as unacceptable collaboration with animal exploiters by some animal activists.
We recommend corporate outreach conditionally, as an intervention which has extremely high potential to increase animal welfare in the short to medium term when conducted thoughtfully. Only some kinds of corporate outreach interventions appear to reach this potential, most notably those that are part of a larger strategy targeting an entire industry. Furthermore, we believe that a sustainable approach to animal advocacy must also consist of elements that attempt to influence public opinion more directly, both to provide further impetus for institutional change and because changes in norms and public opinion have clearer long-term effects than changes in corporate policy or the law alone. |
Area I: Type
There are a number of ways to classify a proposed intervention. These variables will not be expounded upon in detail, but will be included so as to more accurately describe nuanced differences between various campaign types. If multiple campaigns are being analyzed to contribute to an understanding of the general efficacy of an intervention, some classifications may need to be applied to each campaign separately (see for example I.5 Size of Campaign.)
I.1 Activism Philosophy
A campaign might take an “incremental steps” approach to change, or follow a hardline all-or-nothing mentality. It might work to reform existing institutions or to oppose them completely. The following approaches are helpful to consider:
- Animal welfare approach / animal protectionism: attempting to improve the living conditions of animals without necessarily opposing a priori their use by humans for food/labor/etc.
- Animal rights approach: attempting to enforce a set of rights guaranteeing animals certain inalienable protections from harm. This could include such things as a right to be free from involuntary confinement regardless of quality of life.
- Abolitionist approach: a sub-category of the animal rights approach. It seeks to achieve its goal of ending all uses of animals as human property by an all-or-nothing approach. It does not accept incremental change if such change allows for the continued use of animals as human property.
- Antispeciesism approach: treating certain abuses of animals as discrimination on the basis of species membership. This is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the previous two approaches.
I.2 Activism Approach
An intervention might work through direct action, legislative or political lobbying, research and development, or other means.
I.3 Target Demographic
The target demographic is the intended audience for a campaign. A campaign may target multiple demographics, and for some interventions, different campaigns may target different demographics.
I.4 Target Animal(s)
Target animals are the intended beneficiaries of a campaign.
I.5 Size of Campaign
The size of a campaign can be measured in terms of its duration, the amount of money available to sustain it, the number of people involved, and the size of the sponsoring group.
I.6 Time Delay between Intervention and Results
Time delay is a measure of how long will it take for a campaign to effect meaningful change.
I.7 Increase/Decrease in Human Suffering
Humans are animals too, and the effects of a campaign upon human welfare should not be completely ignored.
I.8 Characteristics of Organization Conducting Intervention
The success of a campaign may depend on aspects of the organization conducting the campaign including its age and size, track record with other interventions, quality of staff, and degree of commitment to the intervention. This section is particularly important for determining the applicability of results to campaigns conducted by organizations other than those whose work is considered in this evaluation.
I.9 Appeal to other Organizations
A campaign may appeal to other organizations, funders, or individuals, bringing in support that could not be planned for from its launch. For past campaigns, to what extent has this occurred, and with what organizations? For possible campaigns, what other organizations may lend support, and what circumstances would make this most likely?
I.10 Evaluation
Activism Philosophy | Activism Approach |
---|---|
typically animal welfare | typically lobbying and negotiation, sometimes supported by applications of stockholder or investor pressure or petitions, protests, and other public pressure campaigns |
Target Demographics | Target Animal(s) | Size of Campaign | Time Delay between Intervention and Results |
---|---|---|---|
corporate executives | could be any; in current practice primarily egg-laying hens, breeding sows, and veal calves | usually 1-2 people at a larger organization working with multiple companies at a time | some immediate change; many policies have transition timelines of 5-10 years |
General Summary of Area I (Type). Please also address, if applicable, relevant details about how the intervention is likely to affect human interests; the capability of the organization planning the intervention; and the intervention’s appeal to other organizations. |
---|
Corporate outreach is primarily a tool of animal welfare activists and of animal rights activists focused particularly strongly on pragmatism in the short or medium term, as food corporations can enact policies affecting large numbers of animals based on the decision of a few company executives. Most successful corporate campaigns have addressed particularly cruel confinement practices, though a few have resulted in reformulation of certain recipes to use fewer animal products or the inclusion of more plant-based items on menus, resulting in fewer animals used in industrial agriculture overall.
By their nature these campaigns seem likely to affect human interests in only minimal ways, since corporations have strong incentives not to adopt policies that would significantly reduce their profitability or would be perceived as negatively affecting their products. They probably have some slightly chaotic effects on people working in the food industry as certain practices are favored or avoided by new corporate policies, and as this may affect how well corporations perform relative to one another. For instance, as restaurant chains and supermarkets commit to phasing out gestation crate pork, pork suppliers who also decide early to phase out gestation crates may gain business at the expense of competitors who continue to use gestation crates. Organizations that are able to successfully carry out corporate outreach tend to be highly competent in many areas and have a high degree of pragmatism and professionalism, allowing them to interact productively with the corporate world. Being highly competent in other areas and having a strong reputation enhances credibility of the organization and provides opportunities to coordinate requests made of corporations with results of undercover investigations, legal campaigns, and grassroots organizing. Successful corporate campaigns attract attention and support from those organizations which are open to participating in corporate outreach in principle, because once one company in an industry has adopted a particular policy, it is easier to spread that policy to other companies within that market sector than to work on unrelated corporate campaigns. However, a significant number of animal activist organizations would not be interested in any corporate outreach to mainstream food companies, viewing such work as unacceptable collaboration or compromise. |
Area II: Certainty of Success
Campaigns with identical efficiency ratings can still be differentiated. One way to do this is to focus on the riskiness of an intervention. If efficiency is held constant, riskier campaigns offer a relatively low chance of achieving a relatively high level result. If our estimates of expected value were perfect, we might not care about certainty of success except as it affects organizations’ willingness to attempt a campaign. However, we will not be able to provide perfect estimates of expected value, because in the real world we can never have perfect information. Our estimates of expected value are particularly likely to deviate from reality in the case of risky campaigns, since they succeed only some of the time, and, based on a finite and often small number of attempts, we cannot know the actual success rate with great precision.
II.1 Precedents
The success of future campaigns can be estimated in part by the success of past similar campaigns.
II.1.a Existence of previous attempts
To base predictions on past performances, it must first be established whether or not the proposed intervention has ever been attempted before. If so, it will be useful to know how many times it (or something similar) has been attempted, and whether those attempt(s) were staged in the same setting and context as the intervention currently being considered. The setting and context include such considerations as target demographic, geographical location of campaign, etc. It is generally assumed that unprecedented campaigns are, all things being equal, riskier than campaigns with solid precedents.
II.1.b Variation in efficiency of previous attempts
If a similar intervention has previously been staged, it is important to understand the variation in both costs and results. Campaigns types with a history of unpredictable costs and outcomes are riskier than those with a less chaotic performance record. Wild fluctuations in run costs or in successful outcomes achieved will translate directly to wildly fluctuating measures of efficiency.
II.2 Flexibility of Goals
Campaigns that have lofty, all-or-nothing goals are inherently riskier than campaigns with continuous spectrums of potential positive outcomes. Campaigns that do not have fallback victories will be riskier than campaigns that do. For example, a low-visibility campaign to convince a corporation to stop supporting a certain type of animal testing may fail to produce any positive result if it is not successful. It is thus important to find out if there is only one goal set for the campaign, or if there are a variety of possible outcomes that will satisfy the purpose of the campaign. Campaigns that cast wider nets are less risky than ones that focus on narrow areas of improvement. For example, a gestation crate awareness campaign may have multiple potential goals, including getting its audience to adopt vegan diets, getting its audience to purchase pork from more humane sources, etc.
II.3 Scientific Certainty
There are a variety of scientific disciplines that study issues relevant to the success of animal activist interventions. The extent to which scientists have succeeded at understanding factors relevant to a particular intervention affects our certainty that the intervention will have a positive effect.
II.3.a Nonhuman neuroscience
There is not always clear scientific consensus regarding the neural complexity of nonhuman animals. A greater understanding of an animal’s neural networks allows us to be more certain that it is affected by allegedly harmful practices. For example, a campaign focusing on fishing may have to temper its scientific certainty more than a campaign focusing on pigs (given what is known about the latter’s neuroanatomy, and what is not known about the former’s). In making this determination, it may be necessary to read into the neuroscientific and/or psychological literature on the target animal population in question. We expect this to be a particularly controversial area of research, which will likely evolve along with scientific understanding of nonhuman animal consciousness.
II.3.b Sociology, psychology, and economics
Many campaigns rely upon assumptions about how humans will respond to an intervention, how societies will adapt to proposed change, and/or how economic forces will react to a campaign. It is thus necessary to uncover any ambiguities in the relevant literatures supporting the social science assumptions of an intervention. For example, the reliability of data on recidivism rates amongst new vegans will be important in estimating the certainty of success of a diet-focused campaign.
II.3.c Ecology
The expected effects of an intervention may rest on ecologically-based predictions. These interventions also must be rated based on reliable ecological data. For instance, it may be important to understand how factory farms impact their surrounding environment before being able to reliably quantify the effects of an anti-factory farming campaign.
II.4 Other Uncertainties
There may be other miscellaneous risk factors not yet addressed.
II.4.a Known unknowns regarding an intervention
Some risks are unpredictable, but others may be anticipated with proper planning. Before beginning an intervention, it is advisable to go through all components of a plan of action in order to determine what might go wrong, however unlikely. This is purposefully vague, as this method can be thought of as a “catch-all” for types of uncertainties thus far not addressed. For example, a certain legislative campaign may have to take into consideration the possibility of a cooperating political partner losing a reelection bid. Another campaign may have to take into consideration unfamiliarities in the culture of their target demographic, or a lack of certainty that all members of the campaign team can stay on for the duration of the campaign.
II.4.b Distance between intervention and improvement in animal welfare
The distance between a campaign and the animals it intends to benefit can be defined as the degree of separation or number of steps between an intervention’s activities and the end result of actually helping animals. For example, a campaign to care for rescue animals has a direct impact on animal welfare, while a campaign to train new animal activists would expect to achieve far-removed, indirect results (training → new activists → new campaigns → improvement in animal welfare). Similarly, a campaign to pass a new animal welfare law would also be further removed than caring for animals directly. A greater distance between intervention and result leads to a greater uncertainty of success.
II.5 Evaluation and Error tracking for “Certainty of Success”
Evaluation for II.1.a
How many times has a similar intervention been attempted before?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= No past attempts 7=Multiple organizations have started this type of campaign each year for at least the past decade. |
||||||
Notes: The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) has been running cage-free egg campaigns continually since 2005, working with multiple companies or organizations at any given time. Other organizations such as Compassion in World Farming (CIWF), Mercy For Animals (MFA), Compassion Over Killing (COK), and The Humane League (THL) have also been running some form of corporate campaigns for several years. Campaign types vary, so for any given campaign the relevant track record may not be as long; for instance, HSUS’s gestation crate campaigns have mostly taken place since 2012, and COK has run some campaigns to encourage corporations to eliminate eggs from certain products, but we don’t know of other groups who have conducted such campaigns. |
Has a similar intervention ever been attempted in the same context as the one being evaluated?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Few similarities, and no exact parallels, exist between past campaigns and one being evaluated, in terms of target demographic, geographic location, organizational similarity, etc. … 7=Multiple campaigns have been previously attempted that have identical or near identical contexts as the one being evaluated, in terms of the factors listed above. | ||||||
Notes: For many campaigns, near-exact precedents exist, as organizations work within market sectors to get companies to adopt policies identical or near-identical to those of their closest competitors. However, a minority of campaigns open up “new territory” and do not have close precedents; organizers say these are the most difficult campaigns. |
Evaluation for II.1.b
How widely have previous campaigns varied in total results?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Very wide variation; some campaigns have achieved remarkable results, while others have been completely unsuccessful or counterproductive 7=Very little variation; it is difficult to detect any meaningful difference in results |
||||||
Notes: Within some specific types of corporate campaign, there is less variation: gestation crate campaigns have almost all been successful at implementing very similar policies. Other types of campaigns, such as those for cage-free eggs or to add plant-based menu items have had less reliable success. In particular, campaigns to add plant-based menu items at mainstream chain restaurants seem to have much lower success rates than campaigns to implement policies against confinement practices. We’re aware of only one mainstream chain in the US that added a menu item based on activist efforts. There have been successes with plant-based menu items with local restaurant outreach, through outreach to companies specifically targeting vegetarians (to add vegan products), and in Israel (where the general conditions are very different from those in the US right now). |
How widely have previous campaigns varied in efficiency?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Very wide variation; some campaigns have had large results with few resources, while others have been completely unsuccessful or counterproductive 7=Very little variation; all variation in results can be explained by variation in resources put in |
||||||
Notes: Some of the variation in results above can be explained by variation in resources put in; for example, COK’s campaigns to add plant-based menu items at national chains do not currently receive much staff attention, while HSUS’s successful gestation crate campaigns are backed by two full-time employees, with help from other employees and sometimes other organizations. Some of the variation can be explained by factors other than the amount of resources put in: THL’s corporate campaigns use similar public-pressure tactics to COK’s campaigns and, in contrast to those campaigns, have all succeeded with a few months, but THL’s campaigns are on confinement issues and campaigns about confinement issues seem logically more likely to succeed by using public pressure tactics than campaigns to add new menu items. |
Comment on what is known about the reason(s) for the above mentioned variations between campaigns. Specifically, what variables were external and which were specific to a particular campaign/organization. |
---|
External:
Internal:
The most important variables seem to be internal, especially staff commitment and the characteristics of the chosen goal. Of the external variables, industry situation is the most important, though it is closely tied to the characteristics of the campaign goal. |
How well have previous predictions of results matched actual results?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Very poorly; advance predictions do not appear to correlate with campaigns’ eventual success 7=Very well; successful campaigns were in general widely expected to succeed and unsuccessful ones were clearly longshots |
||||||
Notes: Predictions of results of individual campaigns can be very successful, because success is very tied to industry-wide characteristics which can be observed in prior campaigns. Campaigns of novel types can exceed expectations or disappoint significantly. |
How well have previous predictions of costs matched actual costs?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Very poorly; most campaigns have either raised funds they were unable to use or had unexpected expenses leading them to need more funding than projected 7=Very well; campaign costs have generally matched the planned budget closely |
||||||
Notes: Predictions of costs of individual campaigns can be very successful, especially when campaigns are very similar to previous campaigns. Campaigns of novel types can have surprisingly high or low costs, and costs seem to be slightly less predictable than results, because partial results are rare but there is variation in campaign length even for similar campaigns.
Predictability varies depending on the novelty of the campaign, but most of the campaigns undertaken are similar to previous campaigns, so most of them are fairly predictable. On this and some other scales, two of us disagreed about the appropriate rating for corporate outreach. We attempted to reach consensus on the broad features of the intervention but did not attempt to reach consensus on each individual rating, so where we disagreed, we marked both numbers and include notes reflecting both viewpoints. |
Evaluation for II.2
How many different avenues of success does the campaign have available?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= The campaign has only one major goal or path towards success 7=The campaign has several distinct goals that could each be reached independently |
||||||
Notes: Corporate campaigns generally have only one major goal, but can generate side benefits of publicity and education in the attempt to reach that goal or once the main goal is achieved.
Corporate campaigns sometimes have multiple paths to success, in that if a particularly important campaign is not making progress through direct negotiations, advocates could start using public pressure. This is in some sense a separate path, rather than a continuation of the same path, as it is not necessarily possible for the same organization to apply public pressure and participate in drafting corporate policy; the two actions give advocates different relationships with the corporation. Besides influencing corporate policies, campaigns can have some benefits by pressuring companies and publicizing that pressure. On this and some other scales, two of us disagreed about the appropriate rating for corporate outreach. We attempted to reach consensus on the broad features of the intervention but did not attempt to reach consensus on each individual rating, so where we disagreed, we marked both numbers and include notes reflecting both viewpoints. |
How many intermediate positive outcomes does the campaign have?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Partial success on any of the campaign’s goals has no clear benefits 7=Any step towards any of the campaign’s goals has proportional benefits |
||||||
Notes: Partial success may have some benefits for future work, like beginning a relationship with a company’s executives or educating stockholders or the public. It does not have benefits comparable to achievement of the campaign’s stated goals. |
Evaluation for II.3.a
How well understood are the neurological abilities of the primary group of animals targeted by the campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Understood mostly on an intuitive level 7=Well understood behaviorally and on a neurological level |
||||||
Notes: Corporate outreach generally focuses on animals whose neurological abilities are relatively well understood, especially as pertains to the suffering that the campaign is trying to alleviate, because this eases the task of explaining to executives why a particular practice is especially cruel. |
How well understood are the neurological abilities of any other groups of animals targeted by the campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Understood mostly on an intuitive level 7=Well understood behaviorally and on a neurological level |
||||||
Notes: Some corporate campaigns focus on providing plant-based alternatives on menus and grocery shelves. These target all animal species to some extent, so run the full range of possibilities for how well we understand the target animals’ neurological abilities. |
Comment on the choice of target group(s) of animals by the campaign. Address how well the goals of the campaign align with the ability of the recipient animals to meaningfully benefit from those goals, based on what is known about their neurobiology. |
---|
Corporate outreach campaigns often focus on confinement practices because it is easy to understand intuitively why animals suffer in these situations and because there is direct evidence available about their suffering, including destructive responses to it. The evidence is stronger for pigs than for chickens, as pigs share more of their neurological development with humans. (See for example Lind et.al. 2007 for a review of neuroscience work on pigs.) Such campaigns do not aim to eliminate all suffering from animal agriculture, but to reduce suffering by providing animals an environment where they are more able to engage in their natural behaviors.
Other campaigns focus on removing animals from industrial agriculture entirely by providing plant-based menu items. This removal may be more meaningful for some species of animals than for others. |
Evaluation for II.3.b
How well understood are individual and social group responses to this type of campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Understood mostly on an intuitive or theoretical level 7=Many rigorous studies show very similar responses |
||||||
Notes: The most crucial individual responses are observable actions by executives who activists work with directly, so activists have had plenty of direct experience with their responses. No studies directly address this aspect of the campaigns.
For long term social effects, there is necessarily considerable uncertainty; as with any intervention, it is impossible to fully understand how corporate outreach may ultimately promote or discourage transformation of societal attitudes in regard to animals. It is plausible that corporate outreach leads social attitudes in a good direction by reinforcing a norm that animal suffering matters, but it is also plausible that it delays transformative change by providing a valve that prevents the situation from becoming obviously intolerable to a large segment of society. |
How well understood are economic factors affecting the outcome of this campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Understood mostly on an intuitive or theoretical level 7=Many rigorous studies show very similar responses |
||||||
Notes: Some economic factors, such as the cost to purchase higher-welfare products at the corporate level, seem to be quite well understood, because advocates have spoken to many corporate officers who are well acquainted with the financial situations in which their companies operate. Other relevant factors appear to be understood mainly at a theoretical level. For instance, while studies have shown that media coverage of cruelty to farmed animals reduces demand for meat (Tonsor et.al. 2009), they have not to our knowledge directly addressed the effects of improved corporate policies on demand, though logically they would either increase demand or at least tend to insulate it from the negative potential effects of media coverage. If demand is increased by such policies enough to overcome additional costs to consumers of purchasing higher welfare products, it is possible that promoting such policies could have the unintended effect of increasing production and consumption of animal products. |
Evaluation for II.3.c
How well understood is the primary ecological impact of this intervention?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Understood mostly on an intuitive or theoretical level 7=Many rigorous studies show very similar responses |
||||||
Notes: Most often, corporate outreach is not expected to have significant ecological effects. |
How well understood are any other ecological impacts?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Understood mostly on an intuitive or theoretical level 7=Many rigorous studies show very similar responses |
||||||
Notes: Most often, corporate outreach is not expected to have significant ecological effects. |
Comment on any perceived oversights or uncertain assumptions in the scientific, sociological, economical, and/or ecological rationale behind this campaign. |
---|
Long term effects of raising welfare standards for farmed animals are unknown, and could potentially result in a campaign that appears to reduce animal suffering increasing it over the long run. If corporate welfare policies ultimately affect the number of animals raised in industrial agriculture, they likely also have environmental effects (by helping to determine the size of the animal agriculture industry and thus the extent of its environmental effects, including on ecosystem destruction and global warming). |
Evaluation for II.4.a
How many known uncertainties affect the outcome of the campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= None 7=Several different sources of uncertainty not addressed above |
||||||
Notes: The major known uncertainties are whether increased demand for animal products (resulting from implementation of more humane practices) will in some circumstances result in increased consumption of animal products, or will affect societal perceptions of animal agriculture in a way that affects whether it continues in roughly its present form over the very long term. This affects mainly campaigns for improved welfare, rather than campaigns focused on improving availability of plant-based foods..
For particular campaigns, depending on campaign type, there are varying amounts of uncertainty about the outcome of the campaign generated by uncertainty around how requests can be accommodated in corporate business models and how receptive executives will be. |
How strongly do known uncertainties affect the outcome of the campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= No known uncertainties affect this campaign 7=The success of the campaign hinges upon one or more uncertain factors not explicitly addressed by the campaign itself |
||||||
Notes: Some campaigns’ effectiveness may be seriously affected by the uncertainty about how demand reacts to higher welfare standards and whether such standards affect the long term future of animal agriculture. Other sources of uncertainty (including business models and executive receptiveness) are addressed and to some extent controlled by campaign staff. |
What outside actors and external events are expected to be able to affect this campaign’s success? |
---|
|
What unanticipated problems have befallen past campaigns? How were they handled? |
---|
We do not know of campaigns that have encountered unanticipated problems. |
Evaluation for II.4.b
List the chain of events connecting this intervention to a change in animal welfare, in as much detail as possible. |
---|
|
How many steps does separate the actions of the campaign from a change in animal welfare?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= None; the campaign helps animals directly 7=Very many; the chain is so long that it is difficult to think about in detail |
||||||
Notes: There are several steps between campaign success and improved conditions for animals, but because corporations’ buying decisions occur on a large scale, the steps involving market forces are unusually transparent in effect. |
How many different actors are involved in the chain of events between the success of the campaign and the change in welfare?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= None; the campaign helps animals directly. 7=Very many; the chain is so long or involves such complicated events that it is difficult to identify all actors or groups involved |
||||||
Notes: The chain of events requires steps to be taken at multiple levels in multiple corporations (at least the corporation with the policy and any corporations supplying them with the products affected by the policy), so the exact chain of events and actors involved may be unknown to animal advocates or have room for misinterpretation or error. However, corporations seem to act successfully as single entities in many contexts; considering them in this way, few actors are needed for the success of a given campaign to change animal welfare. |
Summary
General Summary of Area II (Certainty of Success). Summary may include relevant comments about the following topics: what has been learned from previous campaigns; how narrow or flexible are the goals of the campaign; how clearly is the necessary scientific, sociological, economic, and ecological science upon which the campaign’s success relies understood; what is the (metaphorical) distance between the campaign and the animals it is attempting to help; and what other uncertainties should be noted. |
---|
Corporate outreach focused on improving farm animal welfare offers a relatively high certainty of success for a very specific goal. When a campaign succeeds, it results in a corporation implementing a policy that improves the lives of thousands (and in some cases millions) of animals each year that the policy remains in effect. However, when a campaign fails to achieve its main objective, it has limited fallback potential; because corporate outreach campaigns are designed to achieve specific policy changes that will affect many animals over many years, if they cannot achieve these changes, they may not achieve any change at all. Specific campaigns, however, may have some fallback goals which are not necessarily similar in quality to their main goals: for instance, a campaign might involve petitioning a company to change its practice, and the act of distributing the petition might raise public awareness of an issue and have some effects for animals that way, even if the petition is not ultimately successful in contributing to policy change. Other fallback goals are more similar to the main goals of the campaign: for instance, advocates may hope for a company to transition all of its egg purchases to cage-free eggs, but end up helping the company implement a policy of purchasing a certain percentage of cage-free eggs.
Corporate outreach focused on reducing the number of animal products used in commercially prepared foods or on improving the availability of plant-based food options offers a lower certainty of success. For many corporations, removing animal products from existing foods or adding new product lines is a more drastic change to their business model than changing suppliers for animal products, or working with suppliers to implement new policies. Arguments and tactics invoking public opinion also appear to be less useful to this type of campaign, because the public reacts strongly to specific types of animal cruelty but not as strongly to the presence of animal products in food, or to the absence of plant-based options in a particular company’s offerings. (We know this because campaigns against confinement issues that use public pressure to get a company to change its policies typically last for at most a few months before achieving their goals, while campaigns that use similar tactics to get corporations to add vegan menu items can last for years with minimal success.) Additionally, advocates have conducted fewer campaigns of this type on a national scale, so much less is known about their rates of success. As with other corporate outreach campaigns, while they may have potential to affect animals even if their main goals are not reached, these effects are not necessarily similar to the original goal. Any type of corporate outreach follows a relatively short path in terms of the distance between the intervention and the animals affected. Corporations are the entities that most directly affect the lives of animals involved in industrial agriculture, so corporate outreach is a more direct path to helping those animals than interventions focused on legal change (which would have to be enforced on corporations) or appeals to the broader public (which would have to transmit its values to corporations through economic transactions). Previous campaigns have provided significant information about success rates and effective techniques for campaigns seeking to produce welfare improvements, but less information about other types of campaigns which have been less common. They have also produced relatively little information about the long term and spillover effects of any campaigns. The spillover effect that we would be most concerned about is the possibility that by raising animal welfare standards in industrial agriculture, advocates may delay or even prevent significant societal change that would otherwise reduce suffering in agriculture by a substantially larger amount. We don’t know of significant research or analysis that has been done to either support or allay these concerns about welfare interventions generally, or corporate outreach in particular. |
Error Tracking
- How rigorously documented were the reports from past similar campaigns? How reliable is the information that defines the precedents for the campaign?
- Information about previous campaigns is fairly reliable in the aggregate, though we have not received detailed information about a large number of individual campaigns, beyond lists of what has been achieved through successful campaigns. Campaigns generally rely on few personnel and have very clear outcomes, and we have spoken to advocates who have significant experience conducting corporate campaigns, so we think our overall quality of evidence is good.
- What ambiguity exists in the scientific consensus regarding the mental abilities of relevant animals, the sociological and economic effects necessary for the campaign to make a difference, and the campaign’s ecological effects?
- Corporate campaigns target either all farmed animals or cases where the ambiguity around animals’ ability to benefit from changes to their situations is deliberately chosen to be small. While there is substantial ambiguity in the scientific consensus about animal consciousness and suffering overall, corporate outreach is certainly not more subject to this ambiguity than other interventions. There is substantial ambiguity about how corporate outreach affects long-range social and economic considerations, because this has not (to our knowledge) been studied, but little ambiguity about how these considerations affect the success of corporate outreach campaigns, at least for campaigns which fit common models.
- What assumptions were made regarding “other considerations?” What factors may not have been considered?
- The above assessment applies primarily to corporate outreach conducted by groups with existing corporate outreach programs, or by groups with similar agendas and abilities (for instance, groups that have worked on legal campaigns and other institutional campaigns are probably similar enough that the assessment applies). Because it is taken from the experience of relatively few groups, it is possible that some other groups would have very different experiences with otherwise similar campaign attempts, because of other group characteristics.
Area III: Barriers to Entry
There are a myriad of factors to consider when evaluating how difficult an intervention will be to stage. This area of the evaluation examines the complexity of human skill required, the degree of work intensity needed, and the difficulty involved in obtaining the required material resources. This is not meant to duplicate the valuation mechanism laid out in Area V (Efficiency), but rather to provide a separate metric to measure the challenges inherent in putting on a campaign, with no reference to a conversion to fiscal units. This provides part of a cross-check for Area V, since the higher the barriers to entry for a campaign, the better its probable results must be to maintain a constant level of efficiency. In addition to providing a check on the efficiency as calculated below, knowing the barriers to entry for an intervention can help identify which types of group can likely conduct it successfully.
III.1 Skill Required
It is important to know what sort of expertise is required from a campaign’s staff. The more specific knowledge and/or special skills required, the more difficult a campaign will be. For example, a campaign to challenge an anti-whistleblower law will need significant legal expertise and political skill.
III.2 Work Required
The calculation of work required can be defined as a calculation of the intensity of effort required from an intervention’s staff members.
III.2.a Intensity of the work
Intensity is an attempt to quantify how exhausting, physically taxing, and mentally draining campaign-related work is. A more demanding workload indicates a more difficult campaign plan. For example, a campaign to engage strangers on a city street and talk to them about veganism may require exhausting days with lots of mentally taxing social interaction.
III.2.b Hours per week
The number of hours of work per week demanded from staff members compounds the effect of the intensity of their work per unit time. It will be useful to know how many hours per week are required from each type of staff member both at a minimum and at a maximum. A campaign may require a greater commitment around major events.
III.2.c Number of people needed
The number of staff members required for a campaign can be a limiting factor. Like the number of work hours required per week, this value may fluctuate over time.
III.3 Resources Required
It is further useful to examine the complexities involved in obtaining the necessary resources for an intervention. The procurement of materials for an intervention may require difficult-to-obtain permissions, such as copyright waivers, or an extensive search for uncommon objects. For instance, a campaign to develop a new meat substitute that requires a rare chemical has inherent difficulties associated with resource obtainment.
III.4 Evaluation and Error tracking for “Barriers to Entry”
Evaluation for III.1
How many specialized skill sets are required?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= None 7=Many unrelated and specialized skill sets |
||||||
Notes: Experience in conducting corporate campaigns is useful or essential, as are persistence and social skills, but no highly specialized skills are required for most corporate campaigns. Campaigns that incorporate public protest use video and website production skills, but it is fairly easy to contract this work out on a case-by-case basis.
On this and some other scales, two of us disagreed about the appropriate rating for corporate outreach. We attempted to reach consensus on the broad features of the intervention but did not attempt to reach consensus on each individual rating, so where we disagreed, we marked both numbers and include notes reflecting both viewpoints. |
What special skills are required in conducting this campaign? |
---|
Advocates cite persistence and social skills/professionalism as the most important skills to bring to a campaign. Some familiarity with the ways corporations are run and knowledge about the specific policy changes being requested would also be useful, or possibly essential for success.
Campaigns involving publicity elements also use video editing, web development, and marketing skills. These tasks can be contracted out individually and do not necessarily need to be available on an ongoing basis. |
How much expertise is required in the most demanding area?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1=Very little experience or skill 7=Many years’ experience or extensive professional training and advanced degrees |
||||||
Notes: Because advocates initially have limited contact with key decision makers, being able to make a good impression from the start is highly valuable; although the skills required are not specialized, having them to a strong degree is important. |
Comment on the expected ease with which qualified staff members will likely be recruited. This may involved such factors as the job market for a certain profession, the average interest in animal activism from people with certain qualifications, etc. |
---|
Qualified staff members would likely be relatively easy to recruit, because persistence and good social skills are fairly common and (especially social skills) easily identifiable. Some challenges might be that people well suited to operate in a corporate environment could also get corporate jobs (which would likely include opportunities for higher compensation) and that some animal activists might have a hard time blending into the corporate environment enough in appearance and behavior to be effective working with companies. |
Evaluation for III.2.a
How demanding is the typical workload associated with the campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Light; working on the campaign involves little stress and is likely pleasant 7=Heavy; working on the campaign involves significant physical or mental labor at most times |
||||||
Notes: The typical workload on such a campaign would be mentally but not physically stressful for most people. It would probably be least stressful for very outgoing people, but somewhat stressful even for them as activists must persist when their communications are ignored or not replied to favorably. |
What challenges are involved with the daily work of the campaign? |
---|
The greatest challenge on a daily basis would be maintaining activity in the face of disinterest from corporations contacted. There would also be stress around important meetings and presentations, and around coming up with creative ways to respond to setbacks. Some potential staff would find it challenging to maintain a productive relationship with executives at food companies. |
Evaluation for III.2.b
How many hours per week does the typical staff member work on the campaign when it is making its minimum demands?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= 1 or fewer 7=80 or more |
||||||
Notes: When a particular campaign is making minimal demands, a staff member might only be tracking correspondence to ensure that discussions are proceeding or at least not being forgotten. The typical staff member works on multiple campaigns at a time.
Time demands vary by the type of campaign; campaigns with a public pressure element appear to proceed more quickly and require more effort per week than campaigns relying entirely on private communications. The two ratings selected here reflect that the typical level of demands for a given campaign varies by the type of campaign. |
How many hours per week does the typical staff member work on the campaign when it is making its maximum demands?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= 1 or fewer 7=80 or more |
||||||
Notes: When a campaign requires a great deal of attention (immediately prior to an important presentation, while drafting a corporate policy, etc), it might take up much of a staff member’s time because external deadlines must be met in order to present an air of competence and capability |
Note that if the campaign involves several different types of staff roles with different time demands, it may be helpful to answer the above questions for each role rather than for the typical staff member.
Evaluation for III.2.c
How many staff members are involved with the campaign when it is ongoing but at the time when fewest people are working on it?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1=It runs automatically with at most one person supervising it 7=Over 50 |
||||||
Notes: An ongoing campaign requires at least one person’s attention in order to make active progress, but might be able to be left temporarily unattended if necessary without damaging its eventual chances of success (though this would delay progress). |
How many staff members are involved with the campaign at the time when the most people are working on it?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1=It runs automatically with at most one person supervising it 7=Over 50 |
||||||
Notes: A particularly intense campaign might at times require the attention of staff from multiple organizations, or the attention of an organization’s grassroots organizers. Typical campaigns don’t require more than 1-2 staff members’ direct involvement. |
Evaluation for III.3
How many rare or difficult-to-obtain materials does the campaign require?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= None 7=Several which are crucial to the success of the campaign |
||||||
Notes: Some corporate campaigns use organizational reputation, which is easy for some organizations to acquire (they already have it) but hard for new organizations or people working outside an organization. Owning a moderate amount of stock in a corporation (enough to file stockholder resolutions) also provides increased leverage; this expense is not significant for all organizations but would be for some. |
How severe is the difficulty of obtaining the hardest-to-obtain material needed for the campaign?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= There are no materials which will be difficult to obtain 7=There may be an insuperable obstacle to obtaining this material |
||||||
Notes: For someone who wanted to work on corporate outreach but was not already affiliated with an animal advocacy organization, starting an organization and developing a reputation, or joining an organization and convincing it to do this type of work, would be a significant obstacle. It might be possible to circumvent this by working on campaigns using public pressure, where organizational reputation is less relevant than the actual pressure being produced through petitions, media exposure, etc. Another possible avenue for influence would be through donating to an organization to finance corporate campaigns. |
What resources does the campaign require that may be difficult to obtain? |
---|
Some corporate campaigns use organizational reputation, which is easy for some organizations to acquire (they already have it) but hard for new organizations or people working outside an organization. Owning a moderate amount of stock in a corporation (enough to file stockholder resolutions) also provides increased leverage; this expense is not significant for all organizations but would be for some. |
Summary
General Summary of Area III (Barriers to Entry). Summary may include relevant comments about the following topics: the level of complexity of the skill sets needed for the campaign; the intensity of the work; and the feasibility of acquiring needed material resources |
---|
Corporate campaigns seem to be a natural fit for organizations that value professionalism and pragmatism and have a basic level of financial resources. For organizations that take a more radical stance, or for individuals acting on their own, there may be barriers to entry that prevent them doing the work with high effectiveness, including lack of a suitable reputation or inability/unwillingness to form productive relationships with corporations. While campaigns directly using public pressure to induce companies to change avoid some of the need for organizational reputation, they do require either skills connected with reaching the public (through websites and videos or other means) or the ability to hire contractors with these skills.
The skill sets involved are not highly technical or specialized, but at the same time, not everyone is well suited to corporate outreach work. There is a real need for high levels of persistence and social skills, as well as in most cases creativity and ability to work independently. There is no specific educational background or experience required, but we would expect some people to be significantly more effective than others, and that particularly ineffective staff could not just fail to accomplish their goals, but damage prospects for others to succeed later. The intensity of work on a particular campaign can vary widely, which is one reason staff often work on several campaigns at a time. If multiple campaigns progress through a high-effort period at the same time, this could result in a high intensity workload over that period. |
Error Tracking
- What differentiates the campaign from past similar campaigns? Could any of these factors affect the difficulty of achieving the campaign’s goals? Keep in mind that it may be difficult to ascertain which factors may have contributed to a past campaign’s success/failure.
- Campaigns are differentiated primarily by their goals and tactics and the organizations carrying them out. These do clearly affect success rates, though not necessarily resources used, so for a given campaign it is important to pay attention to which past examples are used for comparison.
- How rigorously documented were previous campaigns? Could estimates of staff time spent etc. be in error?
- Average estimates of staff time spent are likely highly accurate, as they are based on the experience of organizations which have conducted many campaigns each. Because staff tend to work on many campaigns at once and may not track how much time is spent on each, estimates of the variability could be in error.
- Have environmental factors changed which would affect either the skills required to conduct the campaign or the difficulty of obtaining necessary materials?
- There are many examples of extremely recent campaigns, so it is not likely that significant environmental changes have occurred between past and present campaigns. One change that appears likely in the near future is that gestation crates will cease to be an issue as pork companies themselves accept that it will be easier to sell their products if they do not use gestation crates. Gestation crate campaigns have been the most reliably successful type of corporate campaign, so campaigns will likely take longer on average and be less likely to produce results with those examples removed.
Area IV: Expected Indirect Effects
Oftentimes, a campaign will have effects that reach beyond its intended goals. These may be positive (i.e. in-sync with the ethics driving the campaign) or negative (i.e. working against the change effected by the campaign). There are multiple factors to consider when evaluating external influence. These effects are especially difficult to estimate precisely because they are often diffuse and because even when campaigns have carefully tracked their progress towards their explicit goals, they may not have attempted to track other effects. However, diffuse and indirect effects of some campaigns may be significant parts of the campaign outcome, so we consider any evidence about these effects as a factor in evaluating interventions.
IV.1 Positive influence
Good externalities may come from a campaign.
IV.1.a Chain effect
A chain effect is when those affected by a campaign spread the message of the campaign and thus extend the influence of the campaign’s message. For example, an online advertising campaign might have a particularly high positive chain effect, due to the ease with which a viewer can share a website or video link with others.
IV.1.b Benevolent slippery slope
It is possible that the success of the campaign will indirectly inspire other positive victories due to social pressure, or desire to imitate. For example, if multiple states enacted bans on gestation crates, some pork producers in other states might bow to public pressure and voluntarily phase them out themselves.
IV.1.c General education
General education is when a campaign instills a certain mindset in some subsection of the public that will go on to produce beneficial outcomes. For example, a campaign to oppose “ag-gag” laws laws might cause some people to develop a negative attitude towards animal agriculture in general, regardless of whether or not the campaign itself is successful.
IV.2 Negative influence
Bad externalities may also arise from an intervention
IV.2.a Alienation
An imperfect campaign may run the risk of turning some potential supporters away from the cause and/or inciting a backlash against the goals of the campaign. For example, a public awareness campaign that uses offensive imagery to make its point may risk alienating potential supporters and/or fueling the influence and credibility of its detractors.
IV.2.b More harm than good
There is also be a chance that the intended results of a campaign might actually be more harmful than beneficial to animals. This is a difficult-to-spot type of negative externality because it requires Researchers to recognize when something is being overlooked in how a certain abusive system would respond to a successful attack against it. For example, a campaign against the consumption of beef might merely push people to consume more chicken (which would be particularly bad as it takes the meat of roughly 200 chickens to equal the same amount of meat from a single cow).
IV.3 Evaluation and Error tracking for “External Influence”
Evaluation for IV.1.a
How large a chain effect does the intervention likely have?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= No reason to expect a chain effect 7=Campaigns often go viral, with a high percentage of people who see hear the message sharing it in close to the original form |
||||||
Notes: There is no reason to expect a spontaneous chain effect, but advocates successfully use previous campaign victories to make new ones easier to reach.
On this and some other scales, two of us disagreed about the appropriate rating for corporate outreach. We attempted to reach consensus on the broad features of the intervention but did not attempt to reach consensus on each individual rating, so where we disagreed, we marked both numbers and include notes reflecting both viewpoints. |
Evaluation for IV.1.b
How likely is the campaign to inspire other victories?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= No reason to expect the campaign to inspire indirect victories 7= Most similar campaigns have inspired successful imitations or victories beyond their expected scope |
||||||
Notes: Successful campaigns often inspire other organizations to pursue similar campaigns, and these are also often successful. For instance, HSUS’s work on gestation crate campaigns inspired similar work by (at least) MFA and THL. There will likely be diminishing returns in a particular area after some point; for instance, gestation crate campaigns may be reaching or have reached that point. But at or around that point, it is also plausible that activists get further inspiration for other campaigns because they see they have transformed the way an entire industry approaches a particular practice, which is more powerful than any individual victory. |
Comment on any evidence (especially taken from observations of past campaigns) suggesting ways in which this intervention may directly or indirectly inspire other activism movements. |
---|
At the current time, several animal advocacy organizations, including but not limited to HSUS, CIWF, MFA, and THL, are working on corporate campaigns around gestation crates and cage-free eggs. It’s quite clear that these campaigns inspire and encourage each other. From conversations with advocates, we know that several groups even meet regularly to discuss common strategy concerns. |
Evaluation for IV.1.c
How significant a change in public mindset is this campaign likely to cause?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= No change; the public will be entirely unaware of or uninterested in the campaign 7=A significant change; the campaign will reach most of the population with a message that is highly contagious and represents a significant departure from current norms |
||||||
Notes: In general, corporate campaigns do not appear to be high visibility for the general public and will likely have limited impacts on the way the public thinks of farmed animals. Corporate campaigns that succeed on a particularly large scale do receive some media coverage and attention, and likely have some impact on what the public thinks about very specific practices. These campaigns have all dealt with incremental changes to animal welfare; hearing of these campaigns might surprise the public when they learn what constitutes current accepted practice, but the newly adopted practices are generally in line with how the public already thinks animals should be treated, or even still may not reach that level of welfare.
A minority of corporate campaigns use public pressure to change corporate behavior. These may be higher visibility, but still are probably only visible to a limited subset of the public; they usually receive numbers of signatures in the range of 10-100 thousand. It is possible that the highest visibility campaigns are those that cause change within the largest corporations, or those which are most heavily promoted by the corporations, regardless of campaign tactics. |
Evaluation for IV.2.a
How much alienation is this campaign likely to cause?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= None; this campaign has no apparent controversial features 7=Significant alienation; a large contingent of potential allies will likely take offense at some aspect of the campaign, and the campaign may be perceived as representing the overall position of a large number of animal advocates |
||||||
Notes: This type of campaign is not likely to produce any alienation among members of the general public. It might produce some alienation among a group’s activist base by being perceived as unacceptable compromise with exploiters of animals. Groups for which this is a serious concern are likely to identify it themselves or not be interested in corporate outreach in the first place.
Some activists feel very negatively about the idea of corporate outreach, so even though there is little risk of alienating the public, there is significant risk of contributing to divisions within the community of animal advocates. On this and some other scales, two of us disagreed about the appropriate rating for corporate outreach. We attempted to reach consensus on the broad features of the intervention but did not attempt to reach consensus on each individual rating, so where we disagreed, we marked both numbers and include notes reflecting both viewpoints. |
Comment on the ways in which this campaign might alienate certain members of the public. Specifically, who might be alienated, and how damaging might the alienation be, in terms of negative impressions carrying over to other similar organizations? |
---|
This type of campaign is not likely to produce any alienation among members of the general public. It might produce some alienation among a group’s activist base by being perceived as unacceptable compromise with exploiters of animals. Groups for which this is a serious concern are likely to identify it themselves or not be interested in corporate outreach in the first place. There is already considerable fragmentation among the animal activist community, with members of certain groups dismissing other groups as ineffective or morally tainted on a regular basis; it is not likely that corporate campaigns in general, or any particular campaign, will dramatically affect this situation. |
Evaluation for IV.2.b
How high is the risk that the campaign may be more harmful than beneficial?
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1= Extremely low risk; the campaign will have few, highly controlled effects 7=High risk; the campaign ignores significant parts of the system it is working in that pose a threat to animals |
||||||
Notes: There is some risk that improved welfare standards will lead to increased demand that counters any increased costs and results in increased animal product consumption. However, it seems likely that if this were so, companies who take the initiative (without being approached by activists) to implement improved welfare standards would be doing so noticeably well that other established corporations would also implement such standards without corporate outreach campaigns. There are many anecdotes of companies who use “humanewashing” as part of a marketing strategy (two notably successful examples are Whole Foods and Chipotle), but anecdotes are quite weak evidence; there are also plenty of successful companies who use other marketing strategies. There is stronger evidence that when industry is exposed as particularly cruel to animals (e.g. through undercover investigations) demand for meat drops; speculatively, claims to treat animals humanely increasing demand could be the other side of this phenomenon.
There is some risk that increased welfare standards will release social pressure that would otherwise lead to more dramatic change for farmed animals. This is highly speculative, but compared to the question of increased demand, it is less clear that market forces would identify and act on this situation on their own if it were true. There is more direct evidence about the impact of meat producers’ policies (and perception of them as humane or not) on demand for meat than on their impact on activists’ behavior. Anecdotally, the impact on activists does not even seem to be all in the direction of more “humane” policies leading to less activist opposition; see for example DxE’s campaign against Chipotle. We relatively rarely see the kind of dramatic change we might imagine corporate outreach preventing, in any field. It’s therefore very hard to understand what factors support or prevent such changes. There is also some risk that the practices with which advocates seek to replace intense confinement are not improvements for the animals in question. This runs counter to intuition, the apparent plurality of expert opinion, and humane standards implemented by law in other countries, so the risk of this seems minimal. Campaigns to add plant-based menu items or adjust recipes to avoid animal products do not seem to be subject to even these concerns. |
What specific practices does the intervention seek to change? Would the replacement practices necessarily be an improvement for the animals involved? |
---|
The two practices that corporate outreach campaigns most commonly seek to change are the use of gestation crates for breeding sows and battery cages for laying hens. There is some debate as to whether replacement practices are better for animals, mainly hinging upon the two ideas that animals do not really care if they can move freely and that when they can move freely, there are more opportunities for accidental injury. However, the evidence that avoiding extreme confinement practices reduces stress for animals seems to be strong, and most experts agree that avoiding these two practices is of significant benefit to the animals involved.
It’s difficult to accurately gauge the level of honest debate, because many participants are interested parties, meaning we should expect to hear some voices saying battery cages are good even if they are clearly bad for hens. There are some health concerns that industry advocates have cited as reasons in favor of using battery cages, but battery cages were phased out in the EU and in some individual countries as a result of the bulk of testimony from veterinarians being against them. With gestation crates, it’s a matter of different physical risks being present with than without crates, and more indicators of psychological distress being present with crates. The debate seems to be less heated, with industry vets saying both systems are okay if well-managed but animal advocates saying that the indicators of psychological distress show crates aren’t okay. |
Summary
General Summary of Area IV (Expected Indirect Effects).Summary may include relevant comments about the following topics: indirect reactions to the campaign (positive and negative); and long-term externalities of the campaign (positive and negative) |
---|
Corporate outreach campaigns demonstrably have some indirect effects through inspiring other organizations to conduct similar campaigns and providing an environment in which it is easier for future corporate and perhaps legislative campaigns to succeed.
They appear to have relatively few long-term effects and relatively little broader spillover, since campaigns that make requests corporations can accede to by their nature do not change the animal agriculture system in a dramatic way that would be highly visible and memorable for the general public. (Though it is possible that corporate campaigns in the future might achieve goals that are broadly in line with public opinion of their time but dramatic by current standards.) There is some chance that they do have long-term effects outside their direct effects, either by raising the expected standard of farm animal welfare in general (and improving long-term practices and/or releasing energy that might otherwise lead to more drastic change) or by bringing corporate practice more in line with the standard of animal welfare the public already expects and thus increasing demand for animal products. It’s not clear what the overall sign of these effects would be, and we’d expect the magnitude to be relatively small in either case, because we think the case where revolutionary change for animals is averted by corporate outreach by activists is unlikely; changes achieved by corporate outreach are likely not dramatic and visible enough to hamper other activist efforts significantly. |
Error Tracking
- What assumptions have been made?
- We have assumed that corporate campaigns have relatively low public visibility and that any effect on public attitudes is of short duration because the campaigns are of limited public interest.
- We have assumed that corporations are rational economic actors in that if adopting higher welfare standards were clearly profitable, they would do so at some point on their own.
- How reliable is the data regarding past campaigns?
- Data regarding past campaigns’ effects on similar later campaigns is fairly reliable. We do not know of any strong evidence regarding past campaigns’ effects on the general public.
- How reliable is data predicting expected responses to various campaign tactics?
- The data predicting responses from corporations is quite reliable. The data predicting wider public response is essentially non-existent or was actually gathered to address another question.
Area V: Expected Direct Effects and Overall Efficiency Analysis
This area of evaluation is designed to produce a single ratio of dollars spent per unit of suffering reduced or per number of animal deaths averted. We believe this is a useful factor to consider when planning an intervention, as different types of campaigns can have vastly different cost/benefit ratios. Given the limited amount of funds available to an organization of any size, this section explores ways of making sure that those resources are used optimally. We break down this calculation into component expenditures and results. If we could rely entirely on the results of this section, for many purposes we could omit the other sections of the evaluation entirely. However, in reality our estimates of both costs and expected results will be fallible, so reasoning about an intervention’s likely effectiveness from other perspectives (as above) allows us to be more confident of our conclusions than we could be about a direct efficiency analysis alone.
V.1 Expenditures
A successful intervention requires the input of resources, both financial and otherwise. It is important to understand and quantify the full extent of the costs to run a campaign.
V.1.a Monetary costs
Monetary costs include both upfront costs to begin an intervention and maintenance costs to sustain an intervention over time. Upfront costs are expenditures that go towards things such as the recruitment of volunteers, the purchase of office supplies, consulting fees, etc. Such expenses can be a limiting factor for an intervention if insufficient liquid capital is available. Maintenance costs are expenditures that are expressed in the form of dollars per unit time or per event. They include things such as material expenses (e.g. pamphlets, gas for vehicles, etc.) and money allocated to train and compensate workers (e.g. salaries for staff, costs involved in educating staff, costs involved in training volunteers for an event, etc.). Maintenance costs also involve non-specific overhead, such as office leases, travel expenses, and salaries/training costs that are not specific to any one event within a campaign. The amount of monetary resources needed for a campaign directly relates to how long a campaign can be sustained for and whether it can even be undertaken in the first place.
V.1.b Personnel
Personnel includes the number of people needed and the level of expertise needed to run an intervention. The number of people needed includes staff, long-term volunteers, single-event volunteers, outside help, consultants, and media coverage by animal activist journalists. While the cost of salaries is covered under “monetary” expenses, there is a clear opportunity cost of using up the time of people who are committed to working on animal activism projects. A poorly planned campaign could pull activists away from other, more effective interventions. The level of expertise required from the personnel includes both pre-existing expertise and the amount of training it is necessary to provide to new recruits. This could range from little to no expertise (e.g. one-off volunteers recruited for discrete events), to high expertise in animal law, high expertise in policy, high expertise in campaign management, high expertise in data analysis, etc. Recruiting the services of a person with a high level of expertise relevant to animal activism carries a higher opportunity cost, given that person’s theoretical ability to do more for a different activism campaign than the average activist.
V.1.c Time
Time refers to the time expenditure by an intervention’s staff, including both time committed during the intervention and time committed to pre-campaign training and planning. The former category involves such things as hourly shifts at events, weekly staff time, one-off consulting appointments, etc. This again is proportional to the magnitude of opportunity cost. TIme committed before an intervention begins includes time for event preparation, market research, experiment conducting, data collection, etc. This is time invested in laying the groundwork for a campaign. A campaign with a very short startup time may in some cases be preferable to a campaign that has slightly more potential effectiveness per unit time, but which also has a long startup time.
V.1.d Unknowns
Unknowns describes the category of unplanned expenses. While unknown expenses are by definition unexpected, it is possible to attempt to consider a range of possible emergency expenses and multiply the cost of each by the likelihood of the unplanned event occurring. This category includes such expenses as legal payments from being sued by a group or person, replacement costs for event materials lost on-site, etc.
V.2 Results (“Profits”)
After estimating expenditure of resources, we estimate the expected “return on investment,” measured by the degree of success a campaign achieves in reducing animal suffering or saving animal lives.
V.2.a Breadth
The breadth of an intervention’s results is defined as the number of people reached by the campaign. It can be expressed as the product of the number of people contacted per event or per time, and the number of events or units of time within the intervention. It is important to understand what is meant by the phrase “reached by the campaign.” A person does not have to be directly contacted by a staff member in order to be “reached”. A legal campaign to change the way a certain farm animal is raised would (if successful) “reach” every person who consumes that animal product.
V.2.b Depth
Depth measures the extent of impact upon animal welfare the average person reached by an intervention will have. This is expressed as the product of multiple terms: the percent of people contacted that end up reducing animal product use (this is to be broadly construed as any lifestyle change that reduces a person’s negative impact on animal welfare, either by completely abstaining from the use of certain animal products or by switching to more humane animal use infrastructures); the amount of time a person who reduces animal product use continues that reduction; the number of animals affected by the animal product use reduction; and the improvement in welfare for each of those animals affected. Each of these factors will here be defined.
The percent of people reducing animal product use is the fraction of people reached by an intervention that make certain measurable changes to their lifestyles (whether voluntarily, as in a dietary change, or involuntarily, as in consuming animals that are raised more humanely under new laws). There may be multiple categories of animal use reduction, with different accompanying conversion rates. For example, from the group of all people reached by an intervention, it might be found that 1% converted to veganism, 6% lowered their overall chicken consumption by a fifth, and 10% will only purchase cage-free eggs.
The amount of time a given lifestyle is adopted is defined as the length of time before a person adopting a new lifestyle is expected to experience recidivism back to their old lifestyle or back to a less humane lifestyle. This time may be different for each type of lifestyle change. The net good done by any given convert is proportional to the amount of time they stick with their newly adopted habits.
The number of animals affected by animal product use reduction measures the number of animals that are expected to have their welfare improved by a lifestyle change made by a person reached by an intervention. Again, this number might be different for each type of lifestyle change. This compensates for the fact that reducing, for example, an average omnivore’s beef intake has a much weaker effect than reducing the same person’s chicken intake, given the relative values of pounds of food produced per animal for cows versus chickens.
Finally, improvement in welfare per animal affected quantifies the decrease in suffering per animal affected by the campaign. Not all changes to an animal’s life are equal. For example, there needs to be a way to compare and rank the gain associated with a chicken being moved from a battery cage to an open pasture with the gain associated with a less painful slaughter method being used on a pig. This is a complex determination. It takes into consideration the improvement in living conditions for each animal, the mental complexity of each animal (i.e. their ability to experience those living changes as ethically meaningful increases in mental well-being), and the number of animals saved from slaughter.
*V.2.b.2 Notes about improvements in welfare
The determination of the variable “improvement in welfare” also requires a decision regarding how to weigh the unit of “lives saved” against “lives improved”. Some animal activists take “reduction of suffering” as their bottom line, and value saving a life only so far as this prevents the suffering associated with animal death. Other activists also include the increase in pleasure as a factor in calculating animal welfare; they would regard lives saved as valuable both for the avoidance of the pain of death and for the gain of life’s pleasures available to an animal spared from death. Finally, some animal activists find intrinsic value in preventing animal deaths, regardless of suffering averted or pleasure increased.
The determination of suffering reduced requires some sort of an understanding of animal neurology, as discussed above in the form of “mental complexity.” This is a difficult variable to quantify, but remains incredibly important to the overall assessment, since less sensitive (with respect to the ability to experience pain) animals should be given less ethical weight compared to more sensitive animals. It is our hope that our ability to rank the welfare of various animals will improve as research into nonhuman animal consciousness progresses. For now, this crucial variable remains a grey area within the analysis.
V.3 Evaluation
Please comment on what has been empirically observed regarding the effect of relevant human lifestyle changes on animal welfare and on what has yet to be empirically determined. |
---|
We calculate direct changes in animal welfare only, because it seems likely that the vast majority of change attributable to corporate outreach follows from direct decisions by corporations to change the conditions of farmed animals. Treating these changes as due to individuals’ lifestyle change adds an unnecessary level of complication and would make our calculations more prone to error and oversight.
We’ve considered the two most prevalent types of corporate outreach campaigns at the present time, gestation crate and cage-free egg campaigns. (For neutral and pessimistic estimates, gestation crate campaigns with different sized corporate targets, and for the optimistic estimate, cage-free egg campaigns.) In either case we assume the change in conditions produced accounts for about half the suffering endured by breeding sows or laying hens, based on Del Mol, et al., 2006; of course, this is a contention that could be debated, but most experts agree that these practices represent a substantial portion of the suffering animals exposed to them endure. Because we are considering dealing with large corporations who can negotiate directly with animal agriculture companies, and in some cases with those companies themselves, we ignore market elasticity; this may not be perfectly accurate. |
Evaluation for V.1.a
What upfront and maintenance costs does the intervention have, including costs of supplies, salaries, and office space? How consistent are these costs between previous campaigns? |
---|
Upfront costs can include stock in the target corporation or a campaign website and video. Rarely, they may include both types of resources. Campaign set-up time is accounted for in the estimates of weekly workload we received from our sources, so we included minimal staff and recruitment time as upfront costs, folding in staff time spent researching the target company etc. into the maintenance staff costs.
Maintenance costs usually include salary and office space for one worker, shared among 2-50 ongoing campaigns at a given time, and (depending on the organization) also among other campaigns not fitting the corporate outreach model. They may also include web hosting or occasional travel to meet in person with corporate executives or stockholders. Upfront costs vary widely between campaigns, depending on whether there is a need to purchase stock and on whether a website and video are produced and if so, by a volunteer or paid contractor. Maintenance costs are fairly similar between campaigns, as far as we can understand. |
Evaluation for V.1.b
How many staff and volunteers are needed for the intervention? Do staff or volunteers require special skills and expertise? If the skill and expertise of staff and volunteers is not fully reflected by the cost of paying and training them, consider including the gap (the opportunity cost of shifting them to this project from any other) in the costs of the campaign accounted for in the calculation sheet. |
---|
For most campaigns, only one staff person is needed. Some campaigns also rely on small time commitments by several other staff or volunteers (e.g. an afternoon of leafleting), or a larger time commitment by a volunteer or contractor (to edit a video or set up a simple website).
Staff require some expertise but no highly specialized training. We have figured costs based on organizations paying a fair market salary. |
Evaluation for V.1.c
How long does the pre-campaign phase of the intervention last? How much time is committed during the intervention? How consistent are these times between different past campaigns? (Be sure to include all the time the campaign takes, including pre-campaign activities, when calculating the costs of the intervention.) |
---|
There is no distinct pre-campaign and during-campaign phase for most campaigns. The time committed to the campaign varies from week to week and between campaigns; we have used averages based on the experience of activists who have participated in many campaigns. The total length of campaigns can also vary greatly, from a few weeks to multiple years, though we believe that longer campaigns likely include less work per week on average than shorter campaigns, which would tend to reduce overall variation in costs. |
Evaluation for V.1.d
What expenses have occurred for some past campaigns but not others? What other emergency or unplanned expenses might a campaign implementing this intervention incur? How likely is each one? Which of these expenses would be one-time expenses, and which might happen repeatedly over the course of the campaign (or become more likely the longer the campaign continues)? |
---|
We are not aware of campaigns incurring unavoidable emergency expenses. However, campaigns incur some expenses in response to a lack of success with the first tactics attempted. For instance, a campaign might incur the costs of travel to shareholder meetings only if early contacts with executives do not result in a policy being written. Similarly, a behind-the-scenes campaign may add public elements such as a dedicated website if other methods fail. These expenses and their probabilities are absorbed in our estimates of staff time spent and expenses generally, as our estimates are based on the aggregate experience of staff who work on multiple campaigns at a time and have worked on many campaigns. |
Evaluation for V.2.a
How many people are reached directly by a typical campaign? How many people change their behavior due to the campaign without being aware of this? How much does the breadth of campaigns of this type vary? |
---|
This is not directly relevant to our method of estimation for this outreach method. We estimate effects by considering total revenue of some past target corporations, and guessing that 1/20-1/10 transactions involve a product affected by the policies activists work to promote. We further estimated that such transactions involve 1 serving of such a product per $8-10 spent. |
Evaluation for V.2.b
What changes do people reached by the campaign make that will affect animals? What percentage of people reached by the campaign make each of these types of change? How much does this vary between different campaigns implementing this intervention? How well-documented and understood are the changes that people make in response to the campaign? For each change, how long do people typically retain the change? How deep of an impact does this make upon animal welfare? How many animals are affected, and how do their conditions change? Again, how well understood are these effects? |
---|
This is not directly relevant to our method of estimation for this outreach method. We estimated that corporate outreach results in policies being implemented 1-10 years before they would be implemented by corporate leaders anyway; this probably varies significantly depending on the corporation and the policy change in question. Using the revenue assumptions above, and assuming all animals possibly targeted by the change were affected (e.g. all breeding sows needed to supply the number of pigs that would produce enough pork for the company’s operations), we estimated the number of animals affected during each year.
In general, corporate outreach relieves animals from the worst confinement practices. The extent to which this relieves their suffering is debatable; we have found some expert sources suggesting it relieves about half the suffering of battery hens, and we used this estimate. |
Evaluation for V.2.b.2
Does this intervention result in animal lives spared or in animal lives improved, or both? Is there exceptionally strong or weak evidence that the animal experience the results of the intervention as a reduction of suffering or increase of pleasure? |
---|
This intervention generally results only in lives improved. We think the evidence that animals take this improvement as relief of suffering is relatively strong, compared to some other possible interventions. |
V.3.1 Calculating Efficiency
We offer a way to calculate as objectively as possible the efficiency for a given campaign measured in the units of animal suffering or animal deaths avoided per US dollar equivalent expended.
Unit of intervention length | weeks | a1 | How the length of the intervention is measured. E.g. “days”, “weeks”, “number of events” | |||
Estimated length of intervention, in intervention units (a1) | 20 | a2 | Use unit defined in a1 |
Pessimistic (Highest) Estimate | Realistic Estimate | Optimistic (Lowest) Estimate | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
One-time expenses | Expenditures that go towards things such as the recruitment of volunteers, the purchase of office supplies, consulting fees, etc. | |||||
Cost of material resources | 5000 | 3000 | 100 | b1 | Supplies, leases, consulting fees, etc. | |
Cost of recruitment and training | 15 | 7 | 0 | b2 | Advertising, value of time spent interviewing, etc. | |
Personnel costs | 15 | 7 | 0 | b3 | Salaries, etc. paid out during startup period | |
Upfront costs | 5030 | 3014 | 100 | b4 | =b1+b2+b3 | |
Recurring expenses | Expenditures that are expressed in the form of dollars per unit time or per event | |||||
Material expenses per intervention unit | 100 | 20 | 0 | c1 | Supplies, travel, etc. | |
Personnel cost per intervention unit | 200 | 30 | 15 | c2 | Salaries, training, etc. | |
Maintenance costs per intervention unit | 300 | 50 | 15 | c3 | =c1+c2 | |
Expenditures total | 11030 | 4014 | 400 | d1 | =b4+c3*a2 | |
Pessimistic (Lowest) Estimate | Realistic Estimate | Optimistic (Highest) Estimate | ||||
Unit of suffering | Years of farmed captivity averted, or equivalent suffering averted | e1 | The unit by which the results of an intervention are measured. This may be “animal lives saved”, “years or year equivalents of a factory farmed hen’s life averted” (see V.2 and V.4 in evaluation guidelines), “years of farmed captivity averted”, or something different. | |||
Direct suffering avoided per intervention unit | 30 | 15000 | 1900000 | f1 | Measured in terms of unit of e1, for all direct results of an intervention (e.g. directly negotiating for the release of an animal from a factory farm) | |
Indirect suffering avoided | None expected | |||||
Results Total | 30 | 15000 | 1900000 | h1 | =f1+g1*g3*a2 | |
Final Total: the proposed intervention has a calculated efficiency of h1/d1, for a campaign of 20 weeks, with results being measured in years of farmed captivity (or equivalent suffering) averted. | ||
---|---|---|
Pessimistic: 30 years of suffering averted per $11,030 spent, or .003 years of suffering averted per dollar. | Realistic: 15,000 years of suffering averted per $4,014 spent, or 4 years of suffering averted per dollar. | Optimistic: 1,900,000 years of suffering averted per $400 spent, or 4750 years of suffering averted per dollar. |
Optional “multiplier” section, which may be used to adjust expenditure / results analysis for unknowns and externalities. This is offered as an optional section due to the particularly speculative nature of these variables:
Cost Multipliers | Pessimistic (Highest) Estimate | Realistic Estimate | Optimistic (Lowest) Estimate | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Unanticipated costs | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1 | i1 | A number between 1.00 and 2.00, according to the following guidelines: A 1.00 would correspond to a campaign that does not expect any unanticipated costs, and a 2.00 to an exceptionally unorganized intervention with virtually nothing planned. | |
Unanticipated revenue | 1 | .8 | .7 | i2 | A number between 0.00 and 1.00, where 0.50 represents an incredibly visible, popular intervention that is likely to attract large donations, and where 1.00 represents a poorly visible and/or unpopular intervention that is not likely to attract any donors at all. As a rough guideline, a 1.00 would correspond to a campaign not expecting any donations at all, and a 0.50 is a campaign that expects to attract $1 in donations for every $2 spent (thus effectively halving expenditures). | |
Results Multipliers | Pessimistic (Lowest) Estimate | Realistic Estimate | Optimistic (Highest) Estimate | |||
Negative backlash | .95 | .98 | 1 | j1 | A number between 0.00 and 1.00, according to the following guidelines: 0.00 for an intervention that is expected to alienate more people from the cause of animal welfare than it expects to positively effect, and 1.00 for an intervention that is expected to have no negative backlash. | |
Social momentum | 1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | j2 | A number between 1.00 and 1.50, where 1.00 represents campaigns where the target audience is very unlikely to spread ideas relating to animal welfare, and 1.50 for a campaign with a target audience that is very likely to spread those ideas. |
Adjusted Final Total: the proposed intervention has a calculated efficiency of (h1*j1*j2)/(d1*i1*i2), for a campaign of 20 weeks, with results being measured in years of farmed captivity (or equivalent suffering) averted. | ||
---|---|---|
Pessimistic: 29 years of suffering averted per $13,236 spent, or .002 years of suffering averted per dollar. | Realistic: 16,170 years of suffering averted per $3,532 spent, or 5 years of suffering averted per dollar. | Optimistic: 2,470,000 years of suffering averted per $280 spent, or 8,821 years of suffering averted per dollar. |
V.4 Calculation Sheet Discussion
A few points on the sheet:
- To express the magnitude of animal suffering avoided within a formula, it is necessary to convert to a common unit. It is difficult to express this as an objectively defined value, so the suggested way to measure the results of a campaign is to list the types and number of animals affected, and the specific ways in which their suffering is expected to be reduced.Ideally, the various forms of suffering prevented by a campaign could all be converted to a common unit. The unit for “results” (i.e. measurement of campaign success) has been defined here as years of factory-farm level suffering (i.e. the amount of suffering experienced across one year on a factory farm) averted. This is a crude unit, as it does not allow for distinctions to be made between different types of animals (with different types of consciousness), and makes it hard to deal with suffering that happens outside of the factory farm industry. It should also be noted that the calculations in the “lifestyle multiplier” chart within the calculation sheet only takes into consideration farmed fish, not wild-caught fish.If an alternative unit is desired, one “YBHS” (“years of battery hen suffering”) could be defined as the negative utility produced by keeping an average hen in a battery cage for one year. A year of non-battery conditions for hens could be estimated as a factor of the YBHS (e.g. it has been suggested in the Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences (Del Mol, et al., 2006) that cage-free facilities reduce the suffering of an egg-laying hen by half; thus, a year of cage-free hen suffering prevented would be equivalent to only 0.5 YBHS avoided). Other non-hen animals could have their yearly suffering also calculated as a factor of the YBHS, after taking into consideration both the nature of their environment and the capacity for the animals to feel pain relative to that of a hen.This is perhaps a more controversial method of calculation, as it requires making estimations about the relative abilities of different animals to experience suffering. While it is clear that the expected suffering of, say, a gestation crate-confined pig is many orders of magnitude stronger than that of a fly caged in a jar, it is not as clear that the same pig should be given greater weight than a battery-caged hen. However, estimations must be made for the purposes of this calculation. To count all animals as equal is itself an estimation, so the decision cannot be easily avoided.
- The expenditures/results multiplier sections include somewhat arbitrary (though intuitively reasonable) coefficient values. This is an attempt to quantify non-directly-calculable variables, in order to adjust the final values accordingly. As more research is done and more information is known about specific campaigns, these coefficients could change dramatically.
- The “total expenditures” and “total results” boxes (f1 and m1) give values specific to a campaign of the length described in a2. It is theoretically scalable to any campaign length, though unless upfront costs scale with campaign length, accuracy will be improved by revising the calculation to address the new length directly.
- The final output is given in terms of unit of animal welfare increase per cost in US dollars.
- The “lifestyle multiplier” key refers to the number of years of factory-farm level animal suffering are expected to be averted due to a person beginning to adopt a certain lifestyle (See I.2.b for more details). This is calculated by: [mean years person is expected to maintain lifestyle] * [number of years of animal suffering avoided per year of lifestyle].
V.5 Error tracking for “Efficiency”
- How reliable is the scientific data on the causal relationship between campaigns and behavioral changes?
- N/A
- How reliable is the scientific data on the causal relationship between behavioral changes and improvements in animal welfare?
- N/A
- How much direct knowledge exists about the costs and outcomes from past campaigns?
- We have reports from two organizations about the number of campaigns they work with at a time, the amount of time staff spend on corporate campaigns, the typical length of their corporate campaigns, and their major non-salary expenditures. In the aggregate we believe this information to be highly reliable, but it does not constitute detailed budgets of or reports on particular campaigns.
- How reliable are budget reports from past, similar campaigns? Could budgets mistakenly fail to list some costs and/or record unrelated expenses as campaign costs? Could some budgets fail to temporally synchronize expenditures with results?
- Some costs may be unaccounted for, especially support costs from other staff not directly involved with corporate campaigns and general operating costs besides office space. The budgets we worked with did not extend to the individual campaign level, so they do not match expenditures on a particular campaign with the results of that campaign alone. This also obscures the level of variability between campaigns.
- Has there been significant economic or social change since the time of past, similar campaigns that might invalidate their quantification of costs/outcomes? What other changes have happened (such as with supply chains for campaign resources) since past, similar campaigns?
- The campaigns we have considered are sufficiently recent that we are not concerned about changes in context for present campaigns or campaigns in the immediate future.
- How reliable are estimates about things like the number of people expected to attend a campaign event, the number of campaign events to be held within a given time span, etc.?
- Estimates of the numbers of animals affected are fairly unreliable because they are based on our (ACE’s) limited understanding of the relationship between certain companies’ revenues and the volume of specific animal products that they sell. Estimates about how many people participate in campaigns and the average length of campaigns are likely more reliable, being made by activists who have had extensive experience with corporate campaigns.